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Abstract
This thesis studies the application of geometric concepts and methods in the anal-
ysis of strategic-form games, in particular bimatrix games. Our focus is on three
geometric concepts: the index, geometric algorithms for the computation of Nash
equilibria, and polytopes.
The contribution of this thesis consists of three parts. First, we present an algorithm
for the computation of the index in degenerate bimatrix games. For this, we define
a new concept, the “lex-index” of an extreme equilibrium, which is an extension of
the standard index. The index of an equilibrium component is easily computable
as the sum of the lex-indices of all extreme equilibria of that component.
Second, we give several new results on the linear tracing procedure, and its bima-
trix game implementation, the van den Elzen-Talman (ET) algorithm. We compare
the ET algorithm to two other algorithms: On the one hand, we show that the
Lemke-Howson algorithm, the classic method for equilibrium computation in bi-
matrix games, and the ET algorithm differ substantially. On the other hand, we
prove that the ET algorithm, or more generally, the linear tracing procedure, is a
special case of the global Newton method, a geometric algorithm for the compu-
tation of equilibria in strategic-form games. As the main result of this part of the
thesis, we show that there is a generic class of bimatrix games in which an equilib-
rium of positive index is not traceable by the ET algorithm. This result answers an
open question regarding sustainability.
The last part of this thesis studies the index in symmetric games. We use a con-
struction of polytopes to prove a new result on the symmetric index: A symmetric
equilibrium has symmetric index +1 if and only if it is “potentially unique”, in the
sense that there is an extended symmetric game, with additional strategies for the
players, where the given symmetric equilibrium is unique.
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1
Introduction
1.1 Geometry and game theory
Geometric ideas are ubiquitous in game theory. Many game theoretic problems
lead naturally to geometric or topological questions. An important example is the
notion of Nash equilibrium, which is the central solution concept in the theory of
strategic-form games. The set of Nash equilibria of a given game carries a natural
geometric structure: It is the set of solutions of a system of polynomial equations
and inequalities, i.e. a semi-algebraic set. In the case of bimatrix games (i.e. two-
player games in strategic form), this set has an even simpler structure: It is given
by a set of linear constraints, coupled with a complementarity condition, hence is
the solution set of a linear complementarity problem. As such, it is a finite union
of polyhedra. This nice geometric structure has been exploited in various aspects
of the study of Nash equilibria.
This thesis explores three geometric concepts that have been widely studied in the
context of strategic-form (and especially bimatrix) games: Polytopes, geometric
algorithms for the computation of Nash equilibria, and the index of an equilibrium.
Before we describe the contribution of this thesis, we would like to give a short
overview of these three concepts in the context of game theory, and explain how
they are linked.
One of the most fundamental geometric concepts used in bimatrix game theory
is that of polyhedra and polytopes. Polytopes have been used both to visualize
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game theoretic ideas and to solve game theoretic problems. A very useful tool in
the study of bimatrix games is the “best-reply polytope”, which is valuable in the
study of Nash equilibria in various respects: Von Stengel (1999) used these poly-
topes to refute the conjecture by Quint and Shubik (1997) on the maximal number
of Nash equilibria that a d × d bimatrix game can have. Von Schemde (2005)
studied stability properties of equilibria using a construction based on best-reply
polytopes. Savani and von Stengel (2006) applied best-reply polytopes to answer
a long-standing open question in algorithmic game theory, namely if the classic
algorithm for the computation of Nash equilibria, the Lemke-Howson algorithm,
has exponential running time.
The computation of one or all Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game is closely linked
to polytopal concepts. For this reason, polytopes constitute a central tool in al-
gorithmic game theory. For example, the extreme equilibria of a bimatrix game
correspond to certain vertices of the best-reply polytope. Hence computing all
Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game essentially corresponds to vertex enumeration
(Vorob’ev, 1958; Avis et al., 2010). Likewise, polytopes are used in the study of
complementary pivoting algorithms for the computation of a single equilibrium
of a bimatrix game. As mentioned earlier, the set of Nash equilibria in bimatrix
games has a particularly nice geometric structure as the solution set of a linear
complementarity problem. A general algorithm for the solution of such a linear
complementarity problem is Lemke’s algorithm (Lemke, 1965), which is a com-
plementary pivoting method that walks along edges of a suitable polyhedron. Two
of the best-known algorithms for the computation of equilibria in bimatrix games,
those by Lemke and Howson (1964) and van den Elzen and Talman (1991), are
both special cases of Lemke’s algorithm (Savani, 2006; von Stengel et al., 2002),
and as such have a straightforward geometric interpretation in terms of polyhedra.
However, the use of geometric tools for equilibrium computation has not been re-
stricted to bimatrix games. Geometric algorithms have also been developed for
the computation of Nash equilibria in general strategic-form games. An example
is the global Newton method by Govindan and Wilson (2003a), which is based
on the particularly nice geometry of the graph of the equilibrium correspondence.
The equilibrium correspondence on the space of strategic-form games of a given
dimension maps each game to its set of equilibria. The graph of this correspon-
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dence is a topological manifold, whose one-point-compactification is homeomor-
phic to a sphere (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). This simple geometric structure
is exploited in the global Newton method for the construction of a geometric al-
gorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium of a given strategic-form game. This
algorithm is an example of the wider class of homotopy (or path-following) algo-
rithms, which trace a path in a generically one-dimensional manifold in order to
find an equilibrium (Herings and Peeters, 2010). Another example of such a ho-
motopy algorithm is the linear tracing procedure introduced by Harsanyi (1975),
which generalizes the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm from bimatrix to general
strategic-form games. The tracing procedure plays a crucial role in the equilibrium
selection theory developed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), and in an equilibrium
refinement concept suggested by Myerson (1997).
Algorithmic problems in game theory are closely related to another important ge-
ometric concept, the index. The index of an equilibrium is a topological notion
which assigns to each connected component of Nash equilibria an integer, such
that the indices of all equilibrium components of a game add up to one. The index
was developed by Shapley (1974) in the context of the Lemke-Howson algorithm,
and all algorithms mentioned above have in common that generically, they will
only find equilibria of positive index (Garcia and Zangwill, 1981).
But the relevance of the index has grown way beyond algorithmic issues. The index
of an equilibrium component carries crucial information about many of its proper-
ties. For this reason, the index plays a considerable role in equilibrium refinement
and selection theory. In nondegenerate bimatrix games, equilibrium components
consist of isolated points, whose index can be either +1 or −1. In such games, it
has been shown that several important properties of an equilibrium depend on its
index. As already mentioned, homotopy algorithms for the computation of equi-
libria, like the Lemke-Howson or van den Elzen-Talman algorithms, will generi-
cally find only equilibria of index +1 (Garcia and Zangwill, 1981). Von Schemde
(2005) proved that an equilibrium has positive index if and only if it can be made
the unique equilibrium of an extended game, where strategies with suitable payoffs
are added. Furthermore, the index carries crucial information about the dynamic
stability of an equilibrium with regards to Nash fields (i.e. vector fields that have
exactly the equilibria of the given game as rest points). Positively indexed equi-
9
Chapter 1. Introduction
libria can be made dynamically stable by a suitable choice of Nash field, whereas
equilibria with negative index are always unstable (Hofbauer, 2003).
In degenerate games, the index is no longer restricted to the values +1 or −1 but
can take any integer as value (Govindan et al., 2003). In this case, the index of an
equilibrium component carries information about the “essentiality” or “stability”
of the component, in terms of payoff perturbations (as opposed to the “dynamic
stability” considered earlier). Various concepts of stability have been suggested
in the search for a satisfying theory of equilibrium refinement and selection, fol-
lowing the main idea that an equilibrium component is stable if it does not vanish
under slight perturbations of the payoffs (see Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and
the subsequent literature). The concept that has been shown to best capture the
interdependence between index and stability is that of hyperstability. An equilib-
rium component is called hyperstable if it is stable in every equivalent game, where
two games are called equivalent if they can be reduced to the same game by delet-
ing “superfluous” strategies that are convex combinations of other strategies. An
equilibrium component is called uniformly hyperstable if the hyperstability con-
dition holds uniformly over all equivalent games. Govindan and Wilson (2005)
proved that an equilibrium component is uniformly hyperstable if and only if it has
nonzero index.
We can conclude that the index, a purely geometric notion, is relevant to the study
of equilibrium properties both in degenerate and nondegenerate bimatrix games.
But geometric ideas are even more ubiquitous in game theory than our exposition
suggests. To give an example, Mertens (1989, 1991) uses homology theory, a tool
from algebraic topology, to study strategic stability. However, we restrict the scope
of this thesis to the three geometric concepts outlined above: Polytopes, geometric
algorithms for equilibrium computation, and the index. The main focus of this
thesis is on bimatrix games, with a notable exception in our study of game theoretic
algorithms in Chapter 3.
1.2 Thesis outline
The contribution of this thesis consists of three parts: As a first result, we present an
algorithm to compute the index in degenerate bimatrix games. In the second part,
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we give several new results on the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi (1975), and
its bimatrix game implementation, the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm. The last
part studies the index in symmetric games; we use a construction of polytopes to
prove a new result on the symmetric index.
In Chapter 2, we first give an exposition of the index of an equilibrium component
in bimatrix games. Then, as the main result of this chapter, we present an algorithm
for the computation of the index in degenerate games.
In nondegenerate games, the index is easily computable, essentially as the sign of
a suitable determinant. However, in degenerate games, where equilibrium com-
ponents can occur, there is no such straightforward method. Existing algorithms
rely on perturbations of the payoffs of the game, or on interior approximations of
a Nash field. In order to arrive at a simpler algorithm, we extend the definition
of the index of isolated equilibria in nondegenerate games to extreme equilibria
in degenerate games. We call this new index notion the lex-index of an extreme
equilibrium.
The crucial ingredient for our algorithm is the following, intuitively appealing re-
sult: The index of an equilibrium component is the sum of the lex-indices over
all extreme equilibria of that component. The lex-index of an extreme equilib-
rium is easily computable, using just the game matrices (A,B), without resorting to
topological concepts such as perturbations or interior approximations. Hence our
method offers an improvement on existing algorithms.
This chapter is joint work with Bernhard von Stengel, intended for publication.
In Chapter 3, we analyze several geometric algorithms for the computation of
Nash equilibria. Our focus is on the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm, a com-
plementary pivoting method for equilibrium computation in bimatrix games. The
algorithm starts at an arbitrary strategy profile, called prior. Both players adjust
their strategies until an equilibrium is reached. This algorithm has the advantage of
being more flexible than the classic algorithm for equilibrium computation in bi-
matrix games, the Lemke-Howson method: While the Lemke-Howson algorithm
relies on a finite set of starting points, the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm can start
anywhere in the strategy space. Another useful property of the latter algorithm is
that it implements Harsanyi’s and Selten’s linear tracing procedure, which plays an
11
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important role in equilibrium selection and refinement theory.
We answer several questions regarding these algorithms. First, we show that the
Lemke-Howson and van den Elzen-Talman algorithms differ substantially: The
van den Elzen-Talman algorithm, when started from a pure strategy and its best
response as a prior, in general finds a different equilibrium than the correspond-
ing Lemke-Howson method. Secondly, we prove that the van den Elzen-Talman
algorithm, or more generally, the linear tracing procedure, is a special case of the
global Newton method, a geometric algorithm for the computation of equilibria in
general strategic-form games introduced by Govindan and Wilson (2003a). As the
third and main result of this chapter, we show that the van den Elzen-Talman algo-
rithm is not flexible enough to find every equilibrium of positive index. Our result
is based on the concept of “traceability”: An equilibrium is called traceable if it
is found by the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm from an open set of priors (Hof-
bauer, 2003). We prove that there is a generic class of bimatrix games in which an
equilibrium of positive index is not traceable. This result answers an open ques-
tion that arises from a closely related notion of sustainability: Myerson (1997)
suggested to call an equilibrium sustainable if it is found by the tracing procedure
from an open set of priors. Our result shows that in this sense, not all equilibria of
positive index are sustainable.
A version of Chapter 3 has been published in Economic Theory (Balthasar, 2010).
In Chapter 4, we analyze the index in the context of symmetric bimatrix games. A
bimatrix game is called symmetric if the players have the same number of strate-
gies, and the two players are interchangeable. More precisely, this means that the
payoff matrix of one player is the transpose of the payoff matrix of the other player.
Symmetric games play an important role in evolutionary game theory, where a
mixed strategy can represent the frequencies of individual pure strategies that occur
in a population. A symmetric game may have both symmetric and non-symmetric
equilibria. In certain situations – for example if the players have no way of de-
termining which of the two possible player positions they are in – it makes sense
to only consider the symmetric equilibria. In a symmetric game, the “symmetric
index” of a symmetric equilibrium is defined analogously to the index in a general
bimatrix game. For any symmetric equilibrium, its symmetric index may differ
from the “usual” (i.e. bimatrix game) index, as can be seen in simple examples like
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the game of chicken.
We prove that in a nondegenerate symmetric game, a symmetric equilibrium has
symmetric index+1 if and only if it is “potentially unique” in the sense that there is
an extended symmetric game, with additional strategies for the players, where the
given symmetric equilibrium is unique. The corresponding statement for bimatrix
games has been proved by von Schemde (2005). However, the symmetric case
does not follow from the seemingly more general result on bimatrix games for the
following reasons: First, as explained above, the bimatrix index and the symmetric
index of a fixed symmetric equilibrium may differ. Secondly, the game needs to
be extended in a symmetric way, but the extension in the corresponding result on
bimatrix game is always asymmetric.
Our proof relies on a construction of polytopes, which should be of independent
geometric interest. Nondegenerate symmetric d× d games correspond to simpli-
cial d-polytopes whose vertices are labelled with labels from the set {1, . . . ,d}.
The symmetric equilibria correspond to completely labelled facets of that polytope,
i.e. facets whose vertices have all labels in {1, . . . ,d} (apart from one completely
labelled facet, which gives rise to an “artificial” equilibrium). Every completely
labelled facet carries a natural orientation. To prove our result on the symmetric
index, it suffices to prove the following statement in the corresponding polytopal
setting: Whenever we have a pair of completely labelled facets of opposite orien-
tation, we can add labelled points to the polytope such that the only completely
labelled facets of the extended polytope are the two given ones. The proof of
this polytopal result is based on ideas developed in von Schemde and von Stengel
(2008), who use a very similar approach for a constructive proof of the correspond-
ing result on the “usual” index of bimatrix games.
We derive the game theoretic result from its geometric counterpart by applying the
above polytopal result to the polytope that corresponds to a given symmetric game.
For a fixed symmetric equilibrium of positive index, we add points to this polytope
such that the only two completely labelled facets of the extended polytope are
the one which corresponds to the given equilibrium, and the “artificial” one. The
added points are then used to define a suitable extension of the symmetric game.
A central part in the step from added points to added strategies is played by a class
of bimatrix games that we call unit vector games. These games generalize the
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imitation games of McLennan and Tourky (2007), who prove that every symmetric
game corresponds to a certain imitation game.
Starting from the added points in the extended polytope we create a symmetric ex-
tension of the given symmetric game in two steps: First, we use the added points to
extend the corresponding imitation game to a unit vector game, by adding strate-
gies for the column player. Secondly, we symmetrize this extended game by adding
suitable payoff rows. This second part, the symmetrization, is the crucial step from
the geometric to the game theoretic result. In the final symmetric extension, the
given symmetric equilibrium is unique.
Chapter 4 is joint work with Bernhard von Stengel, intended for publication.
In the remainder of this chapter, we summarize relevant prerequisites and nota-
tional conventions which we use throughout this thesis.
1.3 Preliminaries
In this section we summarize some terminology and key results about games and
polytopes. The contents of this section can be found in the standard literature on
the subject. For strategic-form games, we refer the reader to Ritzberger (2002), for
bimatrix games to von Stengel (2002, 2007). Details on the theory of polytopes
can be found in Gru¨nbaum (2003) or Ziegler (1995).
By vector we mean column vector (although for reasons of space, in examples we
often write vectors as row vectors). Inequalities between vectors hold component-
wise. As usual, ei denotes the ith unit vector, and 0 and 1 the all-zero- and all-
one-vector, respectively, with dimension understood from context. For a matrix
C, we denote by C> its transpose. We write I for the identity matrix, and E for
the matrix that has all entries equal to one. The dimension of these matrices may
vary according to context. We write C = [c1 · · ·cn] if C is a matrix with columns
c1, . . . ,cn. For a set X , we denote by |X | its cardinality.
A (finite) strategic-form game is given by the following data: a finite set of players,
and for each player, on the one hand a finite set of pure strategies that are available
to him, and on the other hand his payoff function. A strategy profile is a tuple of
strategies, one for each player. A player’s payoff function assigns to each strategy
14
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profile a real number, which is the payoff that this player receives from the strat-
egy profile. Players are allowed to use mixed strategies, i.e. randomize over their
pure strategies. The payoff function is extended to mixed strategies by taking the
expected payoff. Denote by ∆r the r−1-dimensional standard simplex:
∆r = {x ∈ Rr | x>1 = 1, x≥ 0}
The set of mixed strategies of a player who has r strategies can be identified with
∆r, which we also refer to as this player’s strategy space. We use the term strat-
egy space (without reference to a specific player) for the set of all mixed strategy
profiles, which is the cartesian product of the strategy spaces of all players. In a
fixed “dimension” (i.e. when fixing the number of players, and for each player his
number of strategies) a game is determined by the payoffs to the players from the
pure strategy profiles, i.e. by a finite set of real numbers. The space of games in
a fixed dimension is defined as the set of all games in that dimension. It can be
identified with a suitably-dimensional real space Rd .
The central solution concept for a strategic-form game is that of Nash equilibrium.
A strategy profile is called a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to
deviate unilaterally, i.e. if no player can increase his payoff by changing his strategy
while all other players adhere to the equilibrium profile. Nash (1951) proved that
every strategic-form game has an equilibrium. The equilibrium correspondence is
the set-valued function from the space of games to the strategy space that assigns
to each game its set of equilibria.
A bimatrix game is a two-player strategic-form game, in which the payoffs are
given by two m×n matrices (A,B). The first player chooses a row as pure strategy,
the second a column. The payoffs are then given by the respective matrix entry
of A for the first player, and B for the second. We denote the set of strategies of
the first player by {1, . . . ,m}, and that of the second player by {m+ 1, . . . ,m+
n} (instead of {1, . . . ,n}). This has the advantage that we can easily distinguish
between strategies of the two players. When a strategy profile (x,y) is chosen, the
payoff to player one is x>Ay, while that to player two is x>By. A strategy x of
player one is a best reply to a strategy y of player two if it gives maximal expected
payoff to player one, i.e. if we have that for all other strategies x of the first player
x>Ay≥ x>Ay
15
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Player two’s strategy y is a best reply to x if the analogous condition holds for
the payoffs of player two. The support of a mixed strategy z is the set of all pure
strategies played with positive probability; we denote it by supp(z). The best reply
condition (Nash, 1951) states that a mixed strategy x is a best reply to y if and only
if every pure strategy in the support of x is a best reply to y. A strategy profile (x,y)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x and y are best replies to each other.
A very useful geometric tool in the study of bimatrix games are the best reply
polyhedron and best reply polytope. A polyhedron is a subset of Rd that is a finite
intersection of closed half-spaces; a polytope is a bounded polyhedron. Equiva-
lently, a polytope is the convex hull of a finite set of points in Rd . An inequality
c>x≤ α is valid for a polyhedron P if it holds for all points x in P. A set F ⊂ P is
a face of P if there is a valid inequality c>x ≤ α such that F = P∩{x | c>x = α}.
The dimension of a face F of P is the dimension of its affine hull; F has dimen-
sion d if and only if F contains d + 1, but no more, affinely independent points.
The 0- and 1-dimensional faces are called vertices and edges, respectively. For
a polyhedron of dimension d, the faces of dimension d− 1 are called facets. A
d-polytope is a d-dimensional polytope. The edge graph of a polytope consists of
the vertices of the polytope, connected by its edges. To every polytope P we can
assign a partially ordered set, its face lattice. It consists of the faces of P, partially
ordered by inclusion. Two polytopes are called combinatorially equivalent if there
is a bijection between their faces in each dimension that preserves face incidences,
or in other words, if their face lattices are isomorphic. Two polytopes are called
affinely (linearly) isomorphic if there is an affine (linear) map that induces a bijec-
tion between the polytopes. Two polytopes which are affinely isomorphic are, in
particular, combinatorially equivalent (while the converse is generally wrong).
Given a bimatrix game (A,B), the best reply polyhedra for player one and two are
defined as
H1 = {(x,v) ∈ Rm×R | B>x≤ v1, x≥ 0, 1>x = 1}
H2 = {(y,u) ∈ Rn×R | Ay≤ u1, y≥ 0, 1>y = 1}
These polyhedra are the upper envelopes of the best reply function, which assigns
to each strategy of a player the other player’s payoff from his best reply (the best
reply might not be unique, but the best reply payoff is). It is useful to label the
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inequalities that define H1, as follows: For i in {1, . . . ,m}, the inequality xi ≥ 0
has label i, while for j in {m+1, . . . ,m+n}, the inequality e>j B>x≤ v has label j.
This induces a labelling on the relative boundary of H1, where a point carries the
labels of all inequalities that are binding in that point. The points on the relative
boundary of H2 are labelled in an analogous way.
We can use the projection p from H1 onto player one’s strategy space ∆m to transfer
this labelling to the strategy space. A point x∈ ∆m gets all labels that occur at some
point in p−1(x). We get a subdivision of ∆m into several labelled regions, where a
point x has as labels the pure strategies in {1, . . . ,m} that are unplayed at x, and the
pure strategies in {m+1, . . . ,m+n} that are the other player’s best replies to x. We
call the set of strategies of player one that have a certain label j∈{m+1, . . . ,m+n}
of player two the best reply region with label j. Player two’s strategy space ∆n is
subdivided and labelled in an analogous way.
It is obvious from the best reply condition that a strategy pair is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if every strategy by either player which is not a best reply to the other
player’s strategy remains unplayed. Hence a strategy pair (x,y) is a Nash equilib-
rium if and only if it is completely labelled as a point in ∆m×∆n, i.e. if every label
in {1, . . . ,m,m+1, . . . ,m+n} occurs as a label of x or y. In this way the labelling
of the strategy spaces of the two players can be used to visualize Nash equilibria
of low dimensional bimatrix games.
The polyhedra H1 and H2 are unbounded, which makes them difficult to handle.
However, they can be converted into polytopes, the best reply polytopes, which
essentially are combinatorially equivalent to H1 and H2 (or more precisely, pro-
jectively equivalent; for a definition of projective equivalence see Chapter 4.8).
Consider the polyhedra
P1 = {x ∈ Rm | x≥ 0, B>x≤ 1}
P2 = {y ∈ Rn | y≥ 0, Ay≤ 1}
If these polyhedra are bounded, they are polytopes, called best reply polytopes. To
achieve boundedness, it suffices to assume that the entries in the payoff matrices A
and B are positive. This can be done without loss of generality since a constant can
be added to the payoffs of any strategic-form game without changing the structure
of the game. H1 is in bijection with P1\0, via the map (x,v) 7→ x/v. This map
17
Chapter 1. Introduction
is nonlinear but preserves binding inequalities, and therefore the face incidences.
Hence from the labelling of H1, we obtain a labelling of the binding inequalities
of P1 and then, as above, a labelling of the points on the relative boundary of P1.
Similarly, we label the relative boundary of P2. Every completely labelled point of
P1×P2 corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, except for the vertex 0, which carries all
labels because all strategies are unplayed, but does not correspond to any strategy
profile. We call this vertex the artificial equilibrium.
A game is called nondegenerate if no point in ∆m has more than m labels, and no
point in ∆n has more than n labels (see von Stengel (2002) for equivalent definitions
of nondegeneracy). Equivalently, no strategy z of either player can have more than
|supp(z)| pure best replies. For a nondegenerate game, the polytopes P1 and P2 are
simple, i.e. every vertex of P1 is contained in exactly m facets, and similarly for
P2. This implies that in a nondegenerate game, every vertex of P1 has exactly m
labels. Two adjacent vertices of P1 share m−1 labels, namely the labels of the edge
connecting them. A similar observation holds for P2.
The best-known algorithm for the computation of a Nash equilibrium in a non-
degenerate bimatrix game is the Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson,
1964). It is a complementary pivoting method that walks along the edges of the
best reply polytopes. Denote by G the edge graph of the product polytope P1×P2.
The vertices of G are given by pairs of vertices of P1 and P2, while the edges of G
are given by pairs of a vertex of P1 and an edge of P2, or an edge of P1 and a vertex
of P2. The labellings of P1 and P2 induce a labelling of the vertices of G. Choose a
label k ∈ {1, . . . ,m+n}. A vertex of G is called k-almost completely labelled if it
has every label apart from possibly k.
If we delete all vertices from the graph that are not k-almost completely labelled
(and all corresponding edges) the new graph Gk contains all completely labelled
vertices, which correspond to Nash equilibria, and all vertices that have as miss-
ing label k. Since the game is nondegenerate, adjacent vertices in G always have
m+ n− 1 labels in common. Hence the completely labelled vertices of Gk have
degree 1 (which means that they have only one adjacent vertex in the graph), while
the vertices with missing label k have degree 2 (they have two adjacent vertices).
This implies that Gk consists of paths and cycles, where the endpoints of paths are
completely labelled vertices. Starting at the vertex corresponding to the artificial
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equilibrium, one can walk along the corresponding path in Gk, and at the end find
a new completely labelled vertex, which must yield an equilibrium of the game.
For visualization, it is convenient to interpret the Lemke-Howson algorithm in
terms of “picking up” and “dropping” labels in the two players’ strategy spaces.
Instead of walking along edges of the polytope P1×P2, one can view the algorithm
as tracing edges of the polyhedron H1×H2, with “infinity” as starting point. One
can then project the Lemke-Howson path from H1×H2 onto the strategy space.
The terminology of vertices and edges can be taken straightforwardly to the strat-
egy space: A vertex in the strategy space ∆m of player one is a point with m given
labels, and an edge is a nonempty set of points with m− 1 given labels. Vertices
and edges in the other player’s strategy space ∆n are defined analogously. By def-
inition, the (projected) Lemke-Howson algorithm moves alternatingly in the two
players’ strategy spaces, jumping from vertex to vertex along an adjoining edge.
To be more precise, assume that the missing label k belongs to player one. The
projected Lemke-Howson path with missing label k starts at the vertex (ek,e j),
where j is the best reply to k (which by nondegeneracy is unique). The vertex e j
has all labels in {m+1, . . . ,m+n}, apart from j, and one extra label i in {1, . . . ,m},
which is player one’s best reply to j. If i = k, then (ek,e j) is an equilibrium. If
i 6= k, the label i must have been present at player one’s vertex ek (because the
only missing label along the paths is k), hence can be dropped by player one in the
next step. Player one then walks along the edge given by all labels present at ek,
apart from label i, until he reaches a new vertex, where he picks up a new label,
which player two can then drop. This way, the players take turns in picking up
and dropping labels, until an equilibrium is reached. As an example, consider the
Lemke-Howson path with missing label 3 for the following game:
A =

4 4 4
0 0 6
5 0 0
 , B =

6 12 0
0 4 0
8 0 13
 (1.1)
In this example, the Lemke-Howson algorithm finds the equilibrium (5/11,0,6/11),
(4/5,0,1/5). We have illustrated the path that the algorithm traces in the strategy
space in Figure 1.1. We will come back to this example in Chapter 3.
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Figure 1.1: The Lemke-Howson path with missing label 3 for example (1.1).
The left simplex is player one’s, the right one player two’s. Player one’s strate-
gies are labelled 1-3, player two’s have labels 4-6. The labels in the simplex mark
the players’ best reply regions. The labels outside mark the edges of the simplex
where the corresponding strategy is unplayed. The square dot is the equilibrium
that is found by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. The black arrows give the path
of the algorithm, and are numbered in the order in which they occur.
We have now collected all the prerequisites that we require for the following chap-
ters. Whatever else we need will be explained as we go along.
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The index of an equilibrium
component
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we give an exposition to the index, and present an algorithm for the
computation of the index of an equilibrium component in degenerate games. The
index is a topological notion which assigns to each connected component of Nash
equilibria an integer which can be interpreted as an “orientation” of the equilibrium
component. As explained in Chapter 1, the index is useful in a variety of contexts,
particularly in the theory of equilibrium selection and refinement.
In nondegenerate games, where all equilibria are isolated, the index of an equilib-
rium can be easily computed, essentially as the sign of a suitable determinant (see
Definition 4.3). However, for equilibrium components in degenerate games, there
is no such explicit formula. A general method to calculate the index of an equi-
librium component works as follows: Choose a nondegenerate perturbation of the
game, compute the equilibria of the perturbed game, and add up the indices of those
equilibria that are close to the given component (Demichelis and Germano, 2000;
Ritzberger, 2002). However, this approach leads to several complications: First,
it is necessary to actually perturb the game. Second, we need to decide on when
an equilibrium of the perturbed game is close enough to the original component
to warrant being included in the calculation of its index. Due to these drawbacks,
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research has focused on games with a simple structure, like outside option games
(see, for example, Hauk and Hurkens, 2002, von Schemde, 2005), where the index
of a given component is easily computable using the fact that in any bimatrix game,
the indices of all equilibrium components have to add up to +1.
However, for most equilibrium components, such a line of argument is not suf-
ficient, hence a more general method is needed. The algorithm that we suggest
is, in a sense, a simplification of the perturbation method described above. How-
ever, since our algorithm does not require any explicit perturbations, it avoids the
disadvantages of this method.
Our algorithm works as follows: For a given equilibrium component in a degen-
erate game we consider its extreme equilibria, and assign to each of these a new
integer, which we call its lex-index. The crucial ingredient for our algorithm is the
following, intuitively appealing result:
Theorem 2.1. The index of an equilibrium component is the sum of the lex-indices
over all extreme equilibria of this component.
Since the lex-index of an extreme equilibrium is easily computable, this result gives
immediately rise to a “perturbation-free” algorithm for the computation of the in-
dex of a component of Nash equilibria. For its proof, we use the standard pro-
cedure for index computation, as described above: We perturb the game and add
up the indices of equilibria near a given component. For our purpose, we choose
a lexicographic perturbation. Under this perturbation, every extreme equilibrium
decomposes into a finite number of isolated equilibria of the perturbed game, or
vanishes. The lex-index of an extreme equilibrium is defined as the sum of the
indices of all equilibria of the perturbed game that originate from this particular
extreme equilibrium. Using this definition of the lex-index, Theorem 2.1 follows
immediately.
The advantage of our method is that the lex-index can be calculated using a very
simple approach. Both the equilibria of the lexicographically perturbed game and
their indices can be easily computed. Also, for every equilibrium of the perturbed
game it is immediately clear which extreme equilibrium of the original game it
comes from. More precisely, the equilibria of the original game solve a linear com-
plementarity problem (LCP), i.e. an optimization problem with linear constraints
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and a complementarity condition (for precise definitions, see Section 2.3). Every
extreme equilibrium of the original game has one or multiple representations by
“bases” of this LCP. Every basis that is both “lexico-feasible” and “complemen-
tary” corresponds to a unique equilibrium of the perturbed game (the first property,
lexico-feasibility, is needed in order to maintain feasibility of the basis, the second,
complementarity, to keep the equilibrium property in the perturbed game). The in-
dex of this equilibrium can be computed from the payoff matrices using a suitable
lexico-rule. This in turn implies that the lex-index of an extreme equilibrium of the
original game can be easily calculated, by adding up the indices of those equilib-
ria of the perturbed game that come from the bases which represent this particular
extreme equilibrium. It also means that we can avoid explicitly computing the
equilibria of the perturbed game, and their indices. In this sense, the concept of
lex-index, and with it our description of the index of a component in Theorem 2.1,
does not rely on perturbations of the game.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: In Section 2.2, we give a short exposition
to various definitions and properties of the index, and summarize the theoretical
foundations of our algorithm. In Section 2.3, we describe how to perturb a game
lexicographically, and analyze the equilibrium structure of the perturbed game. We
use these perturbations to develop the concept of lex-index, and prove Theorem 2.1
in Section 2.4. We also reformulate this theorem as an explicit algorithm, see
Algorithm 2.12.
2.2 The index
Let (A,B) be an m×n bimatrix game. Since adding a positive constant to the ma-
trices does not change the structure of the game, we can assume without loss of
generality that A,B > 0 for the remainder of this chapter. Recall that the support
supp(z) of a strategy z of either player is the set of pure strategies played with pos-
itive probability, and |supp(z)| the number of strategies in the support of z. The
game is called nondegenerate if every strategy x of the first player has at most
|supp(x)| pure best replies, and similarly for the second player. For an equilibrium
(x,y), denote by Axy and Bxy the matrices obtained from A and B by deleting all
rows that are not contained in the support of x, and all columns that are not con-
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tained in the support of y. In a nondegenerate game, it is straightforward that in an
equilibrium, both players use strategies of equal support size, hence these matrices
must be square. Moreover, they must be nonsingular, since any linear dependency
between rows or columns of the matrices Axy or Bxy can be used to reduce the
support of one of the strategies without changing the set of its pure best replies,
contradicting nondegeneracy (von Stengel, 2002). The index of an equilibrium in
a nondegenerate game can be defined as follows (Shapley, 1974):
Definition 2.2. Let (x,y) be a Nash equilibrium of a nondegenerate bimatrix game
(A,B), where A,B > 0. The index of (x,y) is defined as
(−1)|supp(x)|+1sign det(Axy) det(Bxy). (2.1)
This definition can be extended to games with potentially non-positive entries: Just
add a sufficiently large constant to the game and then define the index using equa-
tion (2.1). This is well-defined, due to part (b) of the next Proposition.
Actually, in Shapley’s definition of the index, the sign of the index is reversed.
However, the above sign convention has been shown to be more convenient. Shap-
ley’s main result, which motivated his definition of the index, holds regardless of
the chosen sign convention: Equilibria at opposite ends of a Lemke-Howson path
have opposite index.
The following proposition (von Schemde and von Stengel, 2008, Proposition 2)
collects some well-known properties of the index.
Proposition 2.3. In a nondegenerate game, the index of a Nash equilibrium
(a) is +1 or −1;
(b) does not change when adding a positive constant to all payoffs;
(c) only depends on the payoffs in the support of the equilibrium;
(d) does not depend on the order of the players’ pure strategies;
(e) is +1 for any pure-strategy equilibrium;
(f) the sum of the indices over all equilibria is +1.
Most of these properties are obvious from the definition, others require some more
work, see von Schemde and von Stengel (2008).
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In degenerate games, the definition of the index is more involved since Definition
4.3 can no longer be applied. There are several ways to extend the definition of
the index to degenerate games and components of equilibria, most of which rely
on the notions of global and local degree of a continuous map. The degree is a
quite advanced topological tool, which is based on the concept of orientations of
manifolds. We give a short exposition to the local and global degree of a continuous
map using standard results and methods from algebraic topology (see, for example,
Dold, 1980, Sections IV.5 and VIII.4, or Hatcher, 2001). An introduction to the
intuition behind the concept of degree can be found in Demichelis and Germano
(2000).
To be mathematically precise, we will have to use homology groups (with inte-
ger coefficients). We try, however, to give some geometric interpretation along
the way that should be accessible to a reader without any knowledge in algebraic
topology. The rough idea behind the degree is the following: Consider a topolog-
ical d-manifold X (i.e. a topological space that is locally homeomorphic to Rd).
Intuitively, the manifold is orientable if we can choose “local” orientations around
every point x in X that are compatible globally, i.e. “glue together nicely”. Hence
a (global) orientation is a collection of local orientations that “fit together”. Now
the global degree of a continuous map f between compact connected orientable
d-manifolds X and Y measures what happens to the global orientation when we
apply f . The local degree of f around a point x measures what happens to the local
orientation around x. For our purposes, it is not necessary to understand the precise
definition of the index as a local degree. The reader preferring to avoid the topolog-
ical bit can skip the following paragraphs and accept Proposition 2.4 as a definition
of the index of an equilibrium component. From Proposition 2.4 onwards we will
not need the notion of local or global degree for the remainder of this thesis.
We formalize the intuitive definition of the degree in terms of homology groups.
We assume the reader to be familiar with the concept of homology; otherwise, the
following can be taken as intuitive (albeit imprecise) “definitions”: For a topo-
logical space X and i ∈ N, the ith homology group HiX essentially measures the
i-dimensional shape of X . For a subset W of X , the ith relative homology group
Hi(X ,W ) encodes the relationship between the homology groups HiW and HiX ,
in a sense made precise by the “long exact homology sequence”. The intuitive
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idea behind the relative homology is to ignore everything that is contained in the
subspace W . Every continuous map f : X →Y between topological spaces induces
group homomorphisms Hi f : HiX →HiY . If W ⊂X and Z ⊂Y such that f (W )⊂ Z,
the map f also induces homomorphisms Hi f : Hi(X ,W )→ Hi(Y,Z). A central ob-
servation is that for a d-manifold X and a point x in X , the relative homology group
Hd(X ,X\{x}) is isomorphic to the group Z of integers. The intuition behind this is
as follows: Relative homology is “local” (in a sense made precise by “excision”, a
very useful tool in homology theory). Since a d-manifold X looks locally like Rd ,
the group Hd(X ,X\{x}) is isomorphic to Hd(Rd ,Rd\{0}), which is a free group
generated by a d-cycle (i.e. a d-simplex or ”topological ball”) around 0.
Hence a generator of Hd(X ,X\{x}) can be interpreted as the choice of a cycle
around the point x. Intuitively, such a cycle, understood as a d-simplex around x,
orients X locally around x, by giving the space “direction”. Hence it makes sense
to define a local orientation of X at a point x to be a choice of generator of
Hd(X ,X\{x}). Equivalently, a local orientation around x is the choice of an iso-
morphism Hd(X ,X\{x}) ∼→ Z. A global orientation is a function that assigns to
each point x a local orientation ox, in a locally consistent way. A manifold is ori-
entable if it has at least one global orientation.
Orientability of a compact, connected d-manifold X implies that the top homology
group HdX is isomorphic to Z. A global orientation of X then corresponds to the
choice of such an isomorphism, or equivalently a choice of a generator of HdX .
This generator is usually called the fundamental cycle of X . A continuous map
f : X → Y between compact, connected, oriented d-manifolds induces a group
homomorphism Hd f on the top cohomology groups, which must correspond to
multiplication by an integer. This integer is called the (global) degree of f . It
counts the “multiplicity” with which Hd f maps the fundamental cycle on X to
the fundamental cycle on Y , hence quantifies how the global orientation changes
under f .
Similarly to a global degree, a continuous map f : X → Y between oriented mani-
folds induces a local degree in the following way: Assume we have a point y in the
range of f whose preimage f−1(y) consists of only one point x. Then f induces
a homomorphism Hd f : Hd(X ,X\{x})→ Hd(Y,Y\{y}). As seen above, both of
these homology groups are isomorphic to Z, where the isomorphism depends on
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the chosen orientation. So Hd f corresponds to multiplication by an integer, which
is called the local degree of f over y. This degree measures the number of cycles
around y obtained from a cycle around x under Hd f . If we interpret the cycle as
a local orientation around x, the local degree quantifies how this local orientation
changes under f . This interpretation coincides with an equivalent definition of
the local degree for differentiable maps of differential manifolds: In the situation
above, assume that additionally, f is differentiable, and x a regular value of f . Then
the local degree of f over y is the sign of the determinant of the Jacobian at x. In
this sense, the local degree indicates if the map is locally orientation-preserving
or -reversing.
The local degree can be extended to the case where f−1(y) is compact, following a
similar concept. A global orientation on X induces a local orientation along every
compact subset of X . On the dth relative homology groups, this orientation along
the compact set is mapped to an integer multiple of the local orientation around y.
This integer is the local degree of f over y. An important property that we need
later is “locality” of the local degree: The local degree of f over y does not change
if we restrict f to some neighborhood of f−1(y), since relative homology groups
are “local”.
Another useful property of the local degree is additivity. Assume X is a finite union
of open sets Xi such that the sets f−1(y)∩Xi are pairwise disjoint. Then the local
degree of f over y is the sum of the local degrees of f |Xi over y. This means that
the local degree of f over y is composed of the local degrees of “localized” (i.e.
restricted) versions of f .
A crucial notion in the context of degree is that of a proper map. A continuous map
is proper if the inverse image of every compact set is again compact. If X and Y
are oriented manifolds, and Y is connected, then for a proper map f : X → Y the
local degree over y is the same for every y in Y . (Moreover, if the manifolds are
both compact and connected, this degree equals the global degree of f as defined
earlier.)
The degree of a continuous map becomes useful in game theory because the in-
dex of an equilibrium component can be defined in terms of degree. There are
several ways of doing this. For example, the equilibria of a bimatrix game can
be represented as rest points, i.e. zeros, of certain vector fields, called Nash fields.
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The index of an equilibrium component can then be defined in dynamic terms as
the “Poincare´ index” of the corresponding component of zeroes of such a Nash
field (see Ritzberger, 1994, or Demichelis and Germano, 2000). The index of a
component of rest points of a Nash field f is the global degree of the map f/|| f ||,
restricted to a small “sphere” around the component of rest points. It can also be
seen as the local degree of f , restricted to a small neighborhood of the component,
over 0. For regular equilibria, it is the sign of the determinant of the corresponding
Jacobian. In this interpretation, the index of a rest point carries information about
its dynamic stability. Equivalently, if we have a Nash map f , i.e. a continuous
map on the strategy space whose fixed points are the equilibria of the game, then
the index of the equilibrium component is the local degree of id− f , restricted to
a neighborhood of the component, over zero (by id we denote the identity map).
This definition does not depend on the choice of Nash map, and for nondegenerate
games yields indeed Shapley’s definition (Govindan and Wilson, 1997b).
If understood as a fixed point index, the index of an equilibrium component carries
information about the “stability” or “essentiality” of a component. A component
of fixed points of a continuous map is called essential if the component does not
vanish under continuous perturbations of the underlying map. This is equivalent
to its index being nonzero (O’Neill, 1953). Hence an equilibrium component of
nonzero index will be stable in the sense that whatever Nash map we choose, every
perturbation of that map will have a fixed point close to that equilibrium.
In game theoretic terms, this “essentiality” of an equilibrium component with
nonzero index translates into a version of hyperstability, a concept that goes back
to Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Recall that a pure strategy of one player is called
redundant if that player has an equivalent strategy, i.e. a convex combination of
his other pure strategies that gives the same expected payoff against any strategy of
the other player. From a game (A,B) we get the reduction of the game by deleting
all redundant strategies. Two games are called equivalent if they yield the same
reduced game. Govindan and Wilson (2005) call an equilibrium component of a
game (A,B) hyperstable if for every equivalent game (A∗,B∗) and every neigh-
borhood U of the component, there is a δ > 0 such that every δ -perturbation of
(A∗,B∗) has an equilibrium that is equivalent to some strategy in U . They call an
equilibrium uniformly hyperstable if the hyperstability condition is met uniformly,
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i.e. if δ can be chosen independently of the equivalent game. Govindan and Wil-
son (2005) proved that an equilibrium component has nonzero index if and only
if it is uniformly hyperstable, answering a long-standing open question as to what
the suitable game-theoretic counterpart of topological essentiality should be. For
a detailed discussion of the link between essentiality and the theory of equilibrium
selection see Govindan and Wilson (1997b).
For computational purposes, we will need yet another definition of the index as the
local degree of the projection from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence
to the space of games. More precisely, consider Rm×n ×Rm×n as the space of
m×n bimatrix games. Let E be the graph of the equilibrium correspondence over
this space of games, i.e. the correspondence which maps each game to its set of
equilibria. Consider the projection map p : E → Rm×n×Rm×n; by Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986), it is homotopic to a homeomorphism. This means that we can
orient E such that p has global degree 1.
Consider an equilibrium component C of a bimatrix game (A,B), and let U be a
neighborhood of C in E that “separates” C from all other equilibria of (A,B). By
this we mean that U does not contain any other equilibria of (A,B) apart from C.
Then the index of C coincides with the local degree of the projection map p, re-
stricted to U , over the game (A,B) (see Govindan and Wilson, 1997a, for bimatrix
games, and Demichelis and Germano, 2000, for general strategic-form games).
Note that by “locality” of the local degree, this definition does not depend on the
choice of U . From the additivity of the local degree it follows easily that for non-
degenerate as well as for degenerate games, the sum of the indices over all equi-
librium components equals +1. However, the index of an equilibrium component
in degenerate games is no longer restricted to {+1,−1}; any integer can occur as
index (Govindan et al., 2003).
It is a well known fact that in order to compute the index of an equilibrium com-
ponent, we can perturb the game slightly, and add up the indices of the equilibria
nearby, see, for example, Demichelis and Germano (2000) or Ritzberger (2002).
However, since this “perturbation-method” is the foundation of our algorithm, we
would like to give and prove a more precise statement, which we suspect to be
well-known but for which we have not found a reference:
Proposition 2.4. Suppose we are given an equilibrium component C of an m× n
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bimatrix game (A,B). For any neighborhood U of C in the graph of the equilibrium
correspondence E whose closure does not contain any other equilibria of (A,B),
there is a neighborhood V of (A,B) in the space of m×n-games such that the fol-
lowing holds: For every game (A′,B′)∈V , the sum of the indices of the equilibrium
components of (A′,B′) that are contained in U equals the index of C.
Proof. The proposition is essentially due to the fact that the projection is locally
proper, which implies that the local degree is “locally independent” of the game
chosen. Coupled with additivity of the local degree, the proposition follows. In
more detail, the proof works as follows: Consider the restriction of the projection
p|U : U → Rm×n×Rm×n. The index of C is the local degree of p|U . The local
degree of a proper map is constant (if the range is connected) (Dold, 1980, IV.5.12
or VIII.4.5). Hence we just need to find a connected open neighborhood V of the
game (A,B) such that p|U is “proper over V ”, i.e. such that p|U∩p−1(V ) is proper.
Let Uδ (C) be the compact δ -neighborhood of C in the equilibrium graph, and
choose δ > 0 small enough such that Uδ (C) is contained in U . Choose V such that
for some δ > 0, (p|U)−1(V ) is contained in Uδ (C) (where V is the closure of V ).
Such a choice of V is possible since the equilibrium correspondence is upper hemi-
continuous, or more precisely, since its graph is closed (and because U does not
contain any equilibria apart from C). For this choice of V , let U ′ = U ∩ p−1(V ).
By construction of V , p|U ′ : U ′ → V is proper. This, together with localness of
the degree, implies that the local degree of p|U is “constant over V ”, by which
we mean that it is the same over every (A′,B′) in V . By additivity (Dold, 1980,
Theorem IV.5.8 or Proposition VIII.4.7), the latter degree is just the sum of the
indices of the equilibria of (A′,B′) that are contained in U .
The version of the index in Proposition 2.4 is most useful for computations, since
it allows for a computation of the index of an equilibrium component based on
perturbations of the game. However, as explained in the introduction, direct ap-
plication of this perturbation-approach leads to several complications. In order to
arrive at a simpler, “perturbation-free” method, we use lexicographic perturbations
as the base of our algorithm, which we develop in the next two sections.
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2.3 A lexicographically perturbed game
Lexicographic perturbations are used to solve degenerate linear programs and lin-
ear complementarity problems by making them nondegenerate (Dantzig, 1963).
In game theory, these perturbations have been used to resolve degeneracies in the
Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson, 1964), and the van den Elzen-
Talman algorithm (von Stengel et al., 2002). We use a slight variation of the con-
cept of lexicographic perturbations to turn a degenerate game into a nondegenerate
one. In the following section, we use this concept of lexicographic perturbation of
a degenerate game to compute the indices of its equilibrium components.
Recall that the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game can be understood as the solu-
tions to a linear complementarity problem (which is a special case of a quadratic
programming problem with linear constraints and a complementarity condition).
Given a bimatrix game (A,B), the equilibria (x,y) of the game are in one-to-one
correspondence with the solutions to the following set of equations and inequalities
(von Stengel, 1996):
1>y = 1
−u1+Ay+ r = 0 (2.2)
y,r ≥ 0
and
1>x = 1
−v1+B>x+ s = 0 (2.3)
x,s≥ 0
such that
x>r = 0 = y>s (2.4)
The variables u and v give the payoffs to the respective players, and r and s are
slack variables that measure how far from being optimal a strategy is.
The systems (2.2) and (2.3) are linear functions of some constrained and uncon-
strained variables, i.e. they are of the form
D(z,z′) = b, z′ ≥ 0
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for some matrix D, a set of unconstrained variables z and a set of constrained
variables z′. In our case, the only unconstrained variables are u and v, respectively;
all other variables are constrained to be nonnegative. D is a k× k′ matrix, where
k′ > k, and has maximal possible rank k: In the first case, D is of the form(
0 1> 0
−1 A I
)
(2.5)
and in the second (
0 1> 0
−1 B> I
)
(2.6)
where I denotes the identity matrix of suitable size. We will need the following
standard terminology of linear programming and its extensions (see, for example,
Dantzig, 1963): A solution to the system D(z,z′) = b is called feasible if it satisfies
the nonnegativity constraints z′ ≥ 0. A feasible solution is called extreme if it can-
not be written as a proper convex combination of two other feasible solutions. A
solution to D(z,z′) = b is called basic if the columns of D that correspond to the un-
constrained and the nonvanishing constrained variables, are linearly independent.
A basis or basic set of variables consists of any set of k variables, containing all
unconstrained variables, such that the square matrix given by the columns of D
corresponding to these variables is non-singular, i.e. those columns form a basis of
Rk. To every such basis we can assign a basic solution of the equation D(z,z′) = b
by setting the non-basic variables to zero and solving for the basic variables (the
solution is then unique). By abuse of terminology we call a basis feasible if the cor-
responding basic solution is feasible. The system D(z,z′) = b,z′ ≥ 0 is called non-
degenerate if in every basic feasible solution, all constrained basic variables have
positive value. By von Stengel (1996), degeneracy of a bimatrix game (given by
positive matrices) is equivalent to degeneracy of the corresponding systems (2.2)
and (2.3).
A central role in our algorithm is played by extreme equilibria. A Nash equilibrium
is called extreme if it cannot be written as a proper convex combination of other
Nash equilibria of the game, i.e. if it gives rise to extreme solutions of (2.2) and
(2.3). Extreme equilibria have the following property:
Proposition 2.5. An equilibrium (x,y) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is extreme if and
only if the corresponding solutions of the systems (2.2) and (2.3) are basic.
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Proof. This follows directly from the following standard result: A point (z,z′) in
Z = {(z,z′) | D(z,z′) = b,z′ ≥ 0} is an extreme point of Z if and only if (z,z′) is a
basic feasible solution. For systems where all variables are constrained, a proof of
this result is given in Dantzig (1963, Theorem 7.1.3); the same proof also works
for systems with unconstrained variables.
We now have all the terminology that we need to describe lexicographic pertur-
bations of bimatrix games. For an m× n bimatrix game (A,B) and ε > 0, define
a perturbed game (A(ε),B(ε)) where A(ε) = A−E(m,n), B(ε) = B−E(n,m)>,
where E(m,n) is the m×n matrix given by
E(m,n) =

ε . . . ε
. . .
εm . . . εm

︸ ︷︷ ︸
n columns
Perturbing the game in this way essentially corresponds to lexicographic perturba-
tions of the corresponding systems (2.2) and (2.3): If we replace A by A(ε) in (2.2),
we get the following system of equations and inequalities:
1>y = 1
−u1+Ay+ r = (ε , . . . ,εm)> (2.7)
y,r ≥ 0
and similarly for system (2.3)
1>x = 1
−v1+B>x+ s = (ε, . . . ,εn)> (2.8)
x,s≥ 0
A solution to those two perturbed systems yields an equilibrium of (A(ε),B(ε)) if
and only it satisfies the complementarity condition (2.4), i.e. if x⊥ r and y⊥ s.
Since the solutions of (2.7) are the same as of the system (2.2) with A replaced by
A(ε), these systems also have the same sets of extreme feasible solutions. As seen
in the proof of Proposition 2.5, the extreme feasible solutions correspond to feasi-
ble bases of the respective systems. Hence the feasible bases of the two systems
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coincide. This may sound obvious, but is equivalent to the following seemingly
non-trivial statement: A subset of m+1 columns of(
0 1> 0
−1 A I
)
(2.9)
is linearly independent and feasible (i.e. the corresponding basic solution is feasi-
ble) if and only if the corresponding subset of(
0 1> 0
−1 A(ε) I
)
(2.10)
is linearly independent and feasible. Similarly, the basic feasible solutions of the
system (2.8) will be the same as those to the system (2.3), with B replaced by B(ε).
We will use this property implicitly several times.
Note that the perturbations in (2.7) and (2.8) are not standard lexicographic pertur-
bations of (2.2) and (2.3), in that the first row in both systems remains unperturbed.
However, these perturbations still lead to nondegenerate systems. The intuition be-
hind this is that the first line of both systems is never degenerate since the degen-
eracies of a game are contained in the matrices A and B, respectively.
Proposition 2.6. For small enough ε > 0, the game (A(ε),B(ε)) is nondegenerate.
It is well-known that a lexicographically perturbed system of equations is non-
degenerate. We slightly adapt the standard proof of this fact to suit out non-
standard perturbations. Recall that a nonzero vector is called lexicopositive if its
first nonzero entry is positive, and lexiconegative otherwise.
Proof. According to von Stengel (1996), we need to prove that in any basic fea-
sible solution to the system (2.7) all basic variables are positive (the correspond-
ing statement for system (2.8) will follow by analogy). Now (2.7) is of the form
D(u,y,s) = (1,0, . . . ,0)>+(0,ε, . . . ,εm)> for the matrix D given in (2.5). For any
basis of the column space of D, denote by S the submatrix of D given by the basic
columns. Then the corresponding basic solution is given by S−1(1,0, . . . ,0)>+
S−1(0,ε , . . . ,εm)>. If we denote the columns of S−1 by [s1, . . . ,sm+1], we get that
the basic solution is given by s1+εs2+ · · ·+εm sm+1. The matrix S−1 can have no
zero row since it has full rank. If a row of S−1 is lexicopositive, the corresponding
basic variable is positive for ε small enough. If the row is lexiconegative, the basic
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variable is negative (hence the corresponding solution will be unfeasible). Hence
in every basic feasible solution to (2.7), the basic variables will be positive.
In order to use the “perturbation method” from Proposition 2.4 to calculate the
index of an equilibrium component of a degenerate game (A,B), we need to under-
stand the equilibrium structure of (A(ε),B(ε)). It turns out that for this, we need
to gain some deeper understanding of bases of the systems (2.2), (2.3), and their
relationship to extreme equilibria of (A,B). In the light of the proof to Proposi-
tion 2.6 we would like to remind the reader of the following terminology: A basis
of the systems (2.2) or (2.3) is called lexicofeasible if for the corresponding basic
matrix S, its inverse matrix S−1 has only lexicopositive rows, i.e. rows in which the
first non-zero entry is positive. Moreover, we call a pair of bases of (2.2) and (2.3)
complementary if the following condition holds: For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have that
at least one of the variables y j and s j is nonbasic, and similarly for any 1≤ i≤ m,
that at least one of the variables xi and ri is nonbasic. In particular, this implies that
the corresponding basic solutions satisfy the complementarity condition (2.4).
In a nondegenerate game, every equilibrium corresponds to a unique pair of bases
of the systems (2.2) and (2.3). By nondegeneracy of the system, this pair of bases
will have to be complementary and lexicofeasible (where by abuse of terminology
we mean a pair of bases to be lexicofeasible if both bases are). For an extreme
equilibrium (x,y) in a degenerate game, however, there may be several bases for
the system (2.2) that yield y as solution, and similarly there may be several bases of
(2.3) that yield x as solution. Hence we may get several pairs of bases of (2.2), (2.3)
that correspond to the extreme equilibrium (x,y). In general, only a few of such
pairs of bases will be both complementary and lexicofeasible. The next Proposi-
tion tells us how to tell the equilibria of (A(ε),B(ε)) from the complementary and
lexicofeasible pairs of bases of the systems (2.2) and (2.3).
Proposition 2.7.
(i) For ε > 0 sufficiently small, the equilibria of (A(ε),B(ε)) are in one-to-one
correspondence with the complementary and lexicofeasible pairs of bases of
(2.2), (2.3).
(ii) Fix such a pair of bases. As ε tends to zero, the corresponding equilibrium
of (A(ε),B(ε)) converges to an extreme equilibrium of (A,B). This limit
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equilibrium is given by the corresponding basic solutions of the unperturbed
systems (2.2), (2.3).
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 2.6, for small ε , lexicofeasibility of a basis of
(2.2) is equivalent to feasibility of the corresponding solutions to the system (2.7),
and similarly for a basis of the system (2.3). Complementarity of the pair of bases
ensures that condition (2.4) is met. Moreover the established correspondence is
one-to-one, since in a nondegenerate game, every pair of complementary bases
gives rise to a different equilibrium. This proves the first part of the Proposition.
As to the second part, for any pair of lexicofeasible complementary bases, the basic
feasible solutions of the perturbed systems (2.7), (2.8) converge to a solution of the
original systems (2.2), (2.3). The latter solution must then be feasible as well,
and also satisfies the complementarity condition (2.4). Hence it corresponds to an
equilibrium of (A,B), which must be extreme due to Proposition 2.5.
From now on, when we consider the game (A(ε),B(ε)), let ε > 0 be sufficiently
small for Propositions 2.6 and 2.7(i) to hold. Proposition 2.7 links every extreme
equilibrium of the unperturbed game (A,B) to a set of equilibria of (A(ε),B(ε)),
via certain bases of the system (2.2), (2.3) that yield that extreme equilibrium as a
solution. Note that an extreme equilibrium in a degenerate game (A,B) may give
rise to several complementary pairs of bases, none (or many) of which may be
lexicofeasible. Consider, for example, the degenerate game
A =
(
1 1
1 2
)
= B> (2.11)
which has two pure Nash equilibria: (1,0),(1,0) and (0,1),(0,1). The first of these
extreme equilibria gives rise to several bases: There are three basic sets of variables
for system (2.2) that contain y1: {u,y1,y2}, {u,y1,r1} and {u,y1,r2}. Analogously,
(2.3) has three corresponding sets of basic variables. Except for the second, these
bases are not lexicofeasible. The bases of the two systems can be combined to nine
different pairs, among which only one is lexicofeasible, namely the pair given by
the basic variables {u,y1,r1} and {v,x1,s1}. However, this basis is not complemen-
tary. Hence by Proposition 2.7, there will be no equilibrium of (A(ε),B(ε)) close
to (1,0),(1,0). This is in line with the fact that for any positive ε , the equilibrium
(1,0),(1,0) will vanish in (A(ε),B(ε)) since it is strongly dominated.
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2.4 Computing the index of an equilibrium component:
The lex-index
Consider an equilibrium component C of a degenerate game (A,B). Proposi-
tion 2.7 tells us how to find all the equilibria of the lexicographically perturbed
game (A(ε),B(ε)) that are close C. By Proposition 2.4, we need to calculate the
indices of these equilibria, and add them up in order to get the index of the compo-
nent. The first part boils down to calculating determinants. It turns out that we will
not have to actually compute the determinants of submatrices of A(ε) and B(ε), as
we would have to if we wanted to use Definition 4.3 for the index computation.
Since we chose a lexicographic perturbation, we will see that it suffices to calcu-
late determinants related to the matrices A and B. Moreover, it turns out that for an
equilibrium of (A(ε),B(ε)), its index will depend only on the corresponding com-
plementary pair of lexicofeasible bases, as we will prove in our next Proposition.
First, however, we need to introduce the following notation:
Definition 2.8. For a square k×k matrix M, denote by [M |i 1] the matrix obtained
from M by replacing the ith column by the vector 1. Define ς(M), called the sign
of M, to be +1 if the vector
[det(M),−det([M |1 1]), . . . ,−det([M |k 1])]
is lexicopositive, −1 if it is lexiconegative, and 0 if it vanishes.
The following proposition expresses the index of an equilibrium of (A(ε),B(ε)) in
terms of signs of submatrices of A and B.
Proposition 2.9. For any lexicofeasible and complementary pair (α,β ) of bases to
(2.2), (2.3), define |β | to be the number of variables xi that are basic (which equals
|α|, the number of variables y j that are basic, since the bases are complementary).
Let Aαβ and Bαβ be the matrices obtained from A and B, respectively, by deleting
all rows and columns corresponding to non-basic variables xi and y j.
For ε sufficiently small, (α,β ) corresponds to an equilibrium of the perturbed
game (A(ε),B(ε)). The index of this equilibrium is
(−1)|β |+1ς(A>αβ )ς(Bαβ )
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Before we prove Proposition 2.9, a useful observation:
Lemma 2.10. For a k× k-matrix M and any k-vector ξ , the determinant of M+
[ξ , . . . ,ξ ] is
det(M)+
k
∑
i=1
det([M |i ξ ])
where [M |i ξ ] denotes the matrix obtained from M by replacing the ith column
with ξ .
Proof. The determinant is multilinear and vanishes if two columns are linearly
dependent.
Proof of Proposition 2.9. Since the game (A(ε),B(ε)) is nondegenerate, the sup-
port size of the equilibrium (x,y) is |β |. By Definition 4.3, the index of the equi-
librium is the sign of
(−1)|β |+1det(A(ε)αβ )det(B(ε)αβ )
To compute the first determinant, abbreviate Aαβ by A, denote the support of x
by {i1, . . . , ik}, where k = |β |, and use Lemma 2.10, with ξ = −(ε i1 , . . . ,ε ik)>, to
calculate
det(A(ε)αβ ) = det
A−

ε i1 . . . ε i1
. . .
ε ik . . . ε ik

= det(A)+ k∑
l=1
det([A |l ξ ]) (2.12)
Laplace determinant expansion along the lth column yields
det([A |l ξ ]) =−
k
∑
h=1
(−1)l+hε ihdet(Ahl)
where Ahl denotes the matrix obtained from A by deleting the hth row and lth
column. Hence we obtain that (2.12) equals
det(A)−
k
∑
h=1
ε ih
k
∑
l=1
(−1)l+hAhl = det(A>)+
k
∑
h=1
ε ih(−det([A> |h 1]))
For small ε this expression (and with it the determinant in (2.12)) is positive (neg-
ative) if and only if the vector
[det(A>),−det([A> |1 1]), . . . ,−det([A> |k 1])]
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is lexicopositive (lexiconegative). Hence we get
sign
(
det(A(ε)αβ )
)
= ς(A>)
which cannot be zero since the game is nondegenerate. The same calculation ap-
plied to B(ε) yields the second half of the index calculation.
Proposition 2.9 makes it easy to calculate the index of any equilibrium compo-
nent, and is the final ingredient for our definition of an index concept for extreme
equilibria, the lex-index. According to Proposition 2.7, every extreme equilibrium
contributes in a precise way to the equilibria of the perturbed game. This result,
together with Proposition 2.9, allows for a suggestive definition of the lex-index of
such an extreme equilibrium. More precisely, for an extreme equilibrium (x,y) of
a game (A,B), defineB(x,y) to be the set of all lexicofeasible and complementary
pairs of bases of (2.2), (2.3) that yield (x,y) as the corresponding basic solution.
Now define the lex-index of (x,y) to be
∑
(α,β )∈B(x,y)
(−1)|β |+1ς(A>αβ )ς(Bαβ ) (2.13)
where |β |, Aαβ and Bαβ are defined as in Proposition 2.9. Essentially, the lex-
index of an extreme equilibrium is the sum of the indices of all equilibria of the
game (A(ε),B(ε)) that come from that extreme equilibrium. For an equilibrium
in a nondegenerate game, the lex-index coincides with the usual definition of the
index. We reformulate the results from Propositions 2.4, 2.7 and 2.9 in terms of
the lex-index, and finally prove Theorem 2.1 from the introduction:
Corollary 2.11. The index of an equilibrium component is the sum of the lex-
indices over all extreme equilibria of this component.
The concept of the lex-index for extreme equilibria can be nicely demonstrated us-
ing the following basic example, given by the matrices A=
(
2 1
1 1
)
, B=
(
1 1
1 2
)
.
This game has just one equilibrium component, whose index is +1. Its extreme
equilibria are (1,0),(0,1), (1,0),(1,0) and (0,1),(0,1). The component con-
sists of two maximal Nash subsets, i.e. maximal convex set of equilibria (Jansen,
1981). The two maximal Nash sets that form the equilibrium component in this
game are given by the set {(1,0),(p,1− p) | p ∈ [0,1]}, the other by the set
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{(q,1−q),(0,1) | q∈ [0,1]}; they intersect in the extreme equilibrium (1,0),(0,1).
What are the indices of those extreme equilibria? It is quite obvious (by iteratively
eliminating dominated strategies) that in the lexicographically perturbed game, all
equilibria apart from (0,1),(0,1) vanish. In terms of our algorithm, this corre-
sponds to the observation that the game gives rise to just one lexicofeasible com-
plementary pair of bases (in which the basic variables are u,y2,r1 and v,x2,s1).
This means that the extreme equilibrium (0,1),(0,1) has lex-index +1, while the
other two extreme equilibria have lex-index zero.
Although in nondegenerate games the lex-index of an equilibrium coincides with
its index, it still makes sense to distinguish between the two concepts for the fol-
lowing reason: The lex-index depends on the specific perturbation that we chose,
which implies that, in general, it is not independent of the order of pure strategies
in the chosen representation of the game. As an example, consider the degenerate
3×2 game
A =

6 0
5 2
3 3
 , B =

0 1
2 0
4 4

This game has one isolated equilibrium, (2/3,1/3,0),(2/3,1/3), and one equilib-
rium component whose extreme equilibria are (0,0,1),(1/3,2/3) and (0,0,1),(0,1).
It is straightforward to see that the isolated equilibrium has index +1, which im-
plies that the component has index 0. In the perturbed game (A(ε),B(ε)), the equi-
librium component decomposes into two equilibria, one of which is pure, hence
has index +1. Since the indices of the two equilibria must add up to zero, the other
equilibrium must have index −1. We conclude that one of the extreme equilibria
has lex-index +1, the other lex-index −1.
Exchanging the two columns of the game essentially does not change the equilib-
rium structure; we get again an isolated equilibrium and an equilibrium component.
This time, however, the two extreme equilibria of the component vanish if we per-
turb the game using our lexicographic perturbation. This implies that both of the
extreme equilibria of the component have lex-index 0.
To conclude this chapter, we summarize our results in the following algorithm
for the computation of the index of the equilibrium component C of a degenerate
bimatrix game (A,B):
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Algorithm 2.12. Input: An equilibrium component C of a bimatrix game (A,B).
Output: The index of C.
Method: Enumerate all extreme equilibria of C, using, for example, one of the
methods by Avis et al. (2010). For every extreme equilibrium, compute its lex-
index as defined in (2.13), using the method lex-index(x,y) in Figure 2.1 below.
Take the sum of the lex-indices over all extreme equilibria of C; this sum equals
the index of C.
bases(x,y):
B = /0;
B(x) = {bases of (2.3) corresponding to x};
B(y) = {bases of (2.2) corresponding to y};
for (α,β ) in B(x)×B(y):
if (α,β ) lexicofeasible and complementary, and (α,β ) /∈B:
B =B∪{(α,β )};
OutputB.
lex-index(x,y):
B(x,y) = bases(x,y);
Compute
i(x,y) = ∑
(α,β )∈B(x,y)
(−1)|β |+1ς(A>αβ )ς(Bαβ )
where Aαβ , Bαβ and |β | are defined as in Proposition 2.9, and ς
is the sign function defined in Definition 2.8;
Output i(x,y).
Figure 2.1: The lex-index method used in Algorithm 2.12, which in turn uses
the bases method.
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Equilibrium Tracing in
Strategic-Form Games
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we investigate several algorithms for the computation of Nash equi-
libria in strategic-form games. The algorithms by Lemke and Howson (1964) and
van den Elzen and Talman (1991) for bimatrix games are complementary pivot-
ing methods; both have been studied extensively. The difference between the two
methods is that while the Lemke-Howson method only allows for a restricted (fi-
nite) set of paths, the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm can start at any mixed strat-
egy pair, called prior, and hence allows to generate infinitely many paths. This
implies that the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm is more flexible than the Lemke-
Howson method. An even more versatile algorithm is the global Newton method
by Govindan and Wilson (2003a), which works for finite strategic-form games. All
three algorithms can be interpreted as homotopy methods, see Herings and Peeters
(2010).
We investigate the relations between these three algorithms. We show that the
Lemke-Howson and van den Elzen-Talman algorithms differ substantially: The
van den Elzen-Talman algorithm, when started from a pure strategy and its best
response as a prior, in general finds a different equilibrium than the corresponding
Lemke-Howson method. This is not surprising since both algorithms can be un-
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derstood as special cases of the global Newton method, but in very different ways.
The Lemke-Howson algorithm has been shown to be a special case of the global
Newton method in Govindan and Wilson (2003b); we prove the corresponding re-
sult for the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm. We generalize this observation to
the statement that for N-player strategic-form games, the global Newton method
implements the linear tracing procedure introduced by Harsanyi (1975).
As a special case of the global Newton method, the van den Elzen-Talman algo-
rithm can generically find only equilibria of index +1. This leads us to the issue
of traceability of equilibria. Following Hofbauer (2003), we call an equilibrium
in a bimatrix game traceable if it is found by the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm
from an open set of priors. As explained above, the van den Elzen-Talman algo-
rithm allows for much greater flexibility than the Lemke-Howson method. Hence
one might hope that, unlike the Lemke-Howson algorithm, it is powerful enough
to find all equilibria of index +1. This raises the question if, generically, all equi-
libria of index +1 are traceable. We answer this question negatively by analyzing
traceability in coordination games.
If a nondegenerate 3× 3 coordination game has a completely mixed equilibrium,
this equilibrium has index +1. In addition, the game has three pure strategy equi-
libria, also of index +1, and three equilibria of support size two, which have in-
dex −1. Hofbauer (2003) noted that in a symmetric 3×3 coordination game, the
completely mixed equilibrium (if it exists) is not traceable. We show that, in gen-
eral, this is only correct as long as we restrict the starting points of the van den
Elzen-Talman paths to symmetric strategy profiles. More precisely, we will see
that the traceability of the completely mixed equilibrium in a 3× 3 coordination
game depends on the specific geometry of the best reply regions. We prove that for
certain generic coordination games the completely mixed equilibrium is traceable.
However, we also show that there is a generic set of coordination games whose
completely mixed equilibrium is not traceable. Hence there is an open set in the
space of 3× 3 bimatrix games that all have an untraceable equilibrium of index
+1. This implies that the flexibility of the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm does
not ensure generic traceability of all equilibria of index +1.
This, in turn, has important consequences for the concept of sustainability. My-
erson (1997) suggested to call an equilibrium sustainable if it can be reached by
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Harsanyi’s and Selten’s tracing procedure from an open set of priors. Since the van
den Elzen-Talman algorithm implements the linear tracing procedure, this notion
of sustainability is for nondegenerate bimatrix games equivalent to the concept of
traceability. Hence the results of this chapter imply that generically not all equilib-
ria of index +1 will be sustainable.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In Section 3.2 we give a short review of
the van den Elzen-Talman method and analyze its relations to the Lemke-Howson
algorithm. In Section 3.3, we give a brief exposition of the global Newton method,
before showing that it encompasses the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm and, more
generally, the linear tracing procedure, as a special case. Section 3.4 contains a
discussion of traceability of equilibria.
A version of this chapter has been published in Economic Theory (Balthasar,
2010).
3.2 Van den Elzen-Talman versus Lemke-Howson
The van den Elzen-Talman algorithm was introduced by van den Elzen and Talman
(1991). It is a homotopy method that finds an equilibrium by starting at an arbitrary
prior and adjusting the players’ replies.
Let (A,B) be an m×n bimatrix game. As usual, denote by ∆m and ∆n the strategy
simplices of players one and two, respectively, and the strategy space by ∆ :=
∆m×∆n. For a subset Z of a real vector space, and a real number α , denote by
α ·Z the set {αz | z ∈ Z}. Take an arbitrary prior or starting point (x,y) ∈ ∆. For
t ∈ [0,1], define a new game (A,B)t , in which the players choose a strategy x∈ t ·∆m
and y∈ t ·∆n, respectively, and get the payoff given by the matrices A and B against
the strategy profile
((1− t)x+ x,(1− t)y+ y)
The game (A,B)t thus is the game that we get from (A,B) when we restrict the
strategy choices of the players to
∆t := (1− t)(x,y)+ t ·∆
The van den Elzen-Talman algorithm traces equilibria of the game (A,B)t , starting
at the prior (x,y) for t = 0, and reaching an equilibrium of (A,B) at t = 1. In
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general, degeneracies can occur along the path even in nondegenerate games. A
discussion on how to resolve these can be found in von Stengel et al. (2002).
The van den Elzen-Talman algorithm can also be described as a complementary
pivoting procedure: A point (x,y) ∈ t · ∆ yields an equilibrium in the restricted
strategy space ∆t if and only if there are suitable vectors r,s and real numbers u,v
such that the following equations and inequalities hold:
A · ((1− t)y+ y)+ r = u1
B> · ((1− t)x+ x)+ s = v1
x>1 = t,y>1 = t (3.1)
x>r = 0,y>s = 0
x,r,y,s≥ 0
The vectors x and y indicate how much weight is put on each strategy in addition to
that given by (1− t)x and (1− t)y. The slack variables r and s show how far from
being optimal a strategy is against the other player’s strategy. The real numbers u
and v track the equilibrium payoff during the computation.
As a complementarity pivoting algorithm, the van den Elzen-Talman method can
be understood as a special case of Lemke’s algorithm (von Stengel et al., 2002).
The latter is a method for solving linear complementarity problems, by augmenting
the original problem by a new variable, whose coefficients are given by a so-called
covering vector (Lemke, 1965). For the case of van den Elzen-Talman, the new
variable is 1− t. The covering vector is essentially given by the payoffs Ay and
B>x against the prior.
The van den Elzen-Talman algorithm can also be understood geometrically as a
completely labelled path in the strategy space ∆. As usual, assume that the players’
pure strategies are numbered 1, . . . ,m for player one and m+1, . . . ,m+n for player
two. Recall that the best reply region for a pure strategy j of player two is defined
as
∆( j) = {x ∈ ∆m | j is a best reply to x}
Now, for a point p = (1− t) · x+ t · x ∈ ∆m define its labels at time t to be
{ j | p ∈ ∆( j)}∪{i | xi = 0}
45
Chapter 3. Equilibrium Tracing in Strategic-Form Games
and similarly for the other player. Then by (3.1), a point in the restricted strategy
space ∆t is an equilibrium of the game (A,B)t if and only if it is completely labelled
at time t. The pivoting steps of the algorithm occur where one of the players picks
up a new label, which then the other player can drop. An analogous description in
terms of “picking up” and “dropping” labels can be used to describe the Lemke-
Howson algorithm, see Section 1.3 or von Stengel (2002). For further details on
the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm we refer the reader to Herings and Peeters
(2010), von Stengel (2002), or the original papers by van den Elzen and Talman
(1991, 1999).
For a nondegenerate bimatrix game, what happens in the van den Elzen-Talman
algorithm if we take the prior x to be any pure strategy vector and y its unique best
reply? This would correspond to a starting point of the Lemke-Howson algorithm,
and one might expect the two algorithms to find the same equilibrium.
However, this is not true. An example where the van den Elzen-Talman and Lemke-
Howson paths lead to different equilibria is given by the 3×3 bimatrix game
A =

4 4 4
0 0 6
5 0 0
 , B =

6 12 0
0 4 0
8 0 13
 (3.2)
and starting point x= (0,0,1),y= (0,0,1). We saw earlier that the Lemke-Howson
algorithm from this starting point finds the equilibrium (5/11,0,6/11), (4/5,0,1/5)
(see example (1.1) and Figure 1.1). However, the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm
starting at this prior finds the pure strategy equilibrium (1,0,0),(0,1,0). This can
be seen from a graphical description of the corresponding van den Elzen-Talman
path, which we have given in Figure 3.1. Another interesting feature of this path is
that the homotopy parameter shrinks at some point during the algorithm. A further
discussion of the relationship between the two algorithms will be provided at the
end of the next section.
3.3 Relationships to the global Newton method
The global Newton method for equilibrium computation was introduced by Govin-
dan and Wilson (2003a); it is a homotopy method for the computation of Nash
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Figure 3.1: The van den Elzen-Talman path from the prior (0,0,1),(0,0,1) for
example (3.2). The left simplex is player one’s, the right one player two’s. Player
one’s strategies are labelled 1-3, player two’s have labels 4-6. The labels in the
simplex mark the players’ best reply regions. The labels outside mark the edges
of the simplex where the corresponding strategy is unplayed. The square dot
is the equilibrium that is found by the Lemke-Howson algorithm, (see Figure
1.1 for a graphic description of the corresponding Lemke-Howson path). The
black arrows give the path of the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm starting at
(0,0,1),(0,0,1), and are numbered in the order in which they occur. The dashed
lines trace the restricted strategy space ∆t after step 5 (upper line) and step 7
(lower line).
equilibria in finite strategic-form games. For simplicity, we will first give a de-
scription of the algorithm for bimatrix games, and then explain how to generalize
it to N-player games.
First we need to introduce a procedure of creating new games from old ones that
goes back to the structure theorem by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986): Starting from
an m× n bimatrix game (A,B) and directional (column) vectors a ∈ Rm, b ∈ Rn,
define a new game (A,B)⊕ (a,b) by adding the vector a to each column of A, and
the vector b> to each row of B. Hence the game (A,B)⊕ (a,b) is given by the
matrices
A+

a1 a1
.
.
. · · · ...
am am
 , B+

b1 . . . bn
.
.
.
b1 . . . bn
 (3.3)
Note that in general this procedure changes the equilibria of the game.
The idea of the global Newton method is as follows: Assume we would like to cal-
culate an equilibrium of a bimatrix game (A,B). For any pair of directional vectors
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(a,b) as above, consider the ray {(A,B)⊕λ · (a,b) | λ ≥ 0} in the space of games.
Take the graph of the equilibrium correspondence (which is the correspondence
that maps each game to the set of its equilibria) over that ray. The structure theo-
rem by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) implies that generically, i.e. for (a,b) outside
a lower-dimensional set, this graph will be a semi-algebraic one-dimensional man-
ifold with boundary, where boundary points are equilibria of the game (A,B). If
we can find an equilibrium for large λ and trace it along that manifold, we arrive
at an equilibrium of the original game.
Although the idea is conceptually straightforward, its implementation is techni-
cally demanding. Govindan and Wilson take advantage of the differentiable struc-
ture which is implicit in the structure theorem. They convert the problem of tracing
equilibria over a ray to one of calculating zeros of piecewise differentiable func-
tions, and for this they use the “original” global Newton method due to Smale
(1976) (hence the name of the method). For further details we refer the reader to
the original paper by Govindan and Wilson (2003a).
For our purpose, all we need to know is that for a bimatrix game (A,B) and a pair of
directional vectors (a,b) in a suitable Euclidean space, the global Newton method
traces equilibria along the graph of the equilibrium correspondence over the ray
{(A,B)⊕λ · (a,b) | λ ≥ 0}
In other words, for the graph E of the equilibrium correspondence, the global New-
ton method traces equilibria along the set
{((A,B)⊕λ · (a,b),(x,y)) ∈ E | λ ≥ 0}
A crucial condition for the algorithm to work is that this set is nondegenerate, in the
sense that it is a one-dimensional manifold (with boundary) without branch points
(by this, we also mean that it may have no branch points “at infinity”). Generically,
however, this nondegeneracy condition is satisfied.
The global Newton method can easily be extended to games with more than two
players. Definition (3.3) means that for each player, a bonus is added to his payoff
from each of his pure strategies, regardless of the other player’s strategy. This
concept has an obvious extension to N-player strategic-form games Γ, where each
player i has a “bonus vector” gi. As in (3.3), we get a new game Γ⊕ (g1, . . . ,gN).
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The global Newton method then traces equilibria over rays of the form
{Γ⊕λ · (g1, . . . ,gN) | λ ≥ 0}
We now prove that the global Newton method comprises the van den Elzen-Talman
algorithm as a special case, and give a generalization of this result to the linear
tracing procedure in the case of a finite strategic-form game. Let (A,B) be an m×n
bimatrix game. Choose a starting point (x,y)∈∆m×∆n. The van den Elzen-Talman
algorithm traces the set
PET ((A,B),(x,y)) =
{(t,(x,y)) ∈ [0,1]×∆m×∆n | (x,y) ∈ ∆t and (x,y) is
an equilibrium of the game (A,B)t
}
where ∆t is the restricted strategy space and (A,B)t the corresponding game defined
in Section 3.2.
For λ ∈ R, define the game
(A,B)x,y(λ ) = (A,B)⊕λ ·
(
Ay,B>x
)
where ⊕ is defined as in (3.3). Let E be the graph of the equilibrium correspon-
dence over the space of bimatrix games Rm×n×Rm×n, and let
PGNM((A,B),(x,y)) =
{
((A,B)x,y(λ ),(x,y)) ∈ E | λ ≥ 0}
be the set of equilibria over the ray of games {(A,B)x,y(λ ) | λ ≥ 0}. This is
the set traced by the global Newton method, when choosing as directional vec-
tor
(
Ay,B>x
)
. The following Proposition states that it is homeomorphic to the
set PET ((A,B),(x,y)), after removing the starting point (0,(x,y)) from the latter.
This establishes the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm as a special case of the global
Newton method.
Proposition 3.1. Let (A,B) be an m× n bimatrix game. Choose a starting point
(x,y) ∈ ∆m×∆n. Let λ : (0,1]→ R≥0, t 7→ 1t −1. Then the map
PET ((A,B),(x,y))\{(0,(x,y))} → PGNM ((A,B),(x,y))(
t,(1− t)x+ tx,(1− t)y+ ty
)
7→
(
(A,B)x,y(λ (t)),(x,y)
)
is a homeomorphism.
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Proof. In the game (A,B), the payoff vector for player one against the strategy
(1− t) · y+ t · y for y ∈ ∆n is
(1− t)Ay+ tAy = ((1− t)(Ay, . . . ,Ay)+ tA)y
where we exploit the fact that y>1 = 1. Similarly the payoff vector for player two
against a strategy (1− t) · x+ t · x for x ∈ ∆m is
(1− t)B>x+ tB>x = ((1− t)(B>x, . . . ,B>x)+ tB>)x
=
(
(1− t)

x> ·B
.
.
.
x> ·B
+ tB)>x.
Hence a strategy profile ((1− t) · x+ t · x,(1− t) · y+ t · y) in the restricted strategy
space is an equilibrium of (A,B)t if and only if (x,y) is an equilibrium of the game
t · (A,B)⊕ (1− t) ·(Ay,B>x).
Since the equilibria of a game remain unchanged by multiplication of the payoffs
by a positive constant, we get that the set PET ((A,B),(x,y)) is given by
{(0,(x,y))} ∪
{
(t,(1− t) · x+ t · x,(1− t) · y+ t · y) | t ∈ (0,1],(x,y) is an
equilibrium of the game (A,B)⊕ (1t −1) ·
(
Ay,B>x
) } ,
which ensures that our map maps indeed to PGNM((A,B),(x,y)). Since it is ob-
viously continuous, we just need to find a continuous inverse. This can be easily
done by taking the inverse map to λ and taking the corresponding continuous map
PGNM((A,B),(x,y))→ PET ((A,B),(x,y))\{(0,(x,y))}
The map from Proposition 3.1 can easily be extended to the point (0,(x,y)) by tak-
ing the one-point-compactification of PGNM((A,B),(x,y)). As an immediate con-
sequence we get that a van den Elzen-Talman path is a one-dimensional manifold
(with boundary) without branch points if and only if the same holds for the corre-
sponding path of the global Newton method (where a branch point at the starting
point of the van den Elzen-Talman path would correspond to a branch point “at
infinity” of the path of the global Newton method). If both paths satisfy this non-
degeneracy condition, both algorithms will find the same equilibrium.
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An alternative proof for Proposition 3.1 can be given using Lemke’s algorithm:
For bimatrix games, the global Newton method corresponds to Lemke’s algorithm
(with potentially non-positive covering vectors), see Govindan and Wilson (2003a).
The bonus vector for the global Newton method essentially corresponds to the
covering vector used in Lemke’s algorithm. Using that the van den Elzen-Talman
method is a special case of Lemke’s algorithm, Proposition 3.1 follows.
Proposition 3.1 can be generalized to N-player games as follows: It has been
proved in van den Elzen and Talman (1999) that the van den Elzen-Talman algo-
rithm implements the linear tracing procedure, which was introduced by Harsanyi
(1975). The linear tracing procedure is a method for selecting a Nash equilibrium
in an N-player game; it plays a key role in the equilibrium selection theory devel-
oped by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). For any prior (i.e. mixed strategy profile),
the linear tracing procedure traces equilibria over a set of games whose payoffs
are given as a convex combination of the original payoffs, and payoffs against the
prior. To make this more precise, choose an N-player strategic-form game Γ and a
prior p, and denote by Γi(σ) the payoff of player i against a mixed strategy com-
bination σ . For 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, define a game Γt , which has the same sets of players
and strategies as Γ, but the payoff in Γt to player i from a strategy combination σ
is defined as
Γti(σ) = tΓi(σ)+(1− t)Γi(σi, p−i) (3.4)
where (σi, p−i) is the strategy combination that results from p by replacing player
i’s strategy pi by σi. The linear tracing procedure traces the graph of the equilib-
rium correspondence over the set of games {Γt | t ∈ [0,1]}, which in almost all
cases will be a one-dimensional manifold. For t > 0 we can divide the payoffs
given in (3.4) by t without changing the equilibria of the game, and as in the proof
above we can conclude the following generalization of Proposition 3.1, which is
one of the central results of this chapter:
Theorem 3.2. The global Newton method implements the linear tracing procedure.
It has been proved in Govindan and Wilson (2003b) that the global Newton method
also comprises the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Proposition 3.1 raises the ques-
tion of how the latter algorithm as a special case of the global Newton method
differs from the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm. If we take the ith unit vector
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ei for some pure strategy i of player one, the global Newton method for the ray
(A,B)⊕λ · (ei,0) corresponds to the Lemke-Howson algorithm with missing label
i. An analogous statement holds for missing labels of player two; for further details
see Govindan and Wilson (2003b). So the Lemke-Howson algorithm corresponds
to taking unit vectors as directional vectors for the global Newton method, whereas
the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm is based on directional vectors (Ay,B>x). Fur-
ther differences between the two algorithms will emerge in the analysis of coordi-
nation games in the next section: We will see that in this type of game, the Lemke-
Howson algorithm only finds the pure strategy equilibria, whereas for certain co-
ordination games, the van den Elzen-Talman method can also find the completely
mixed equilibrium.
3.4 Traceability and the index of equilibria
In this section we discuss which equilibria can be traced by the van den Elzen-
Talman algorithm. Of course every equilibrium can be found by taking it as start-
ing point. However, we are only interested in those that are found generically. As
suggested by Hofbauer (2003), we call an equilibrium of a nondegenerate bimatrix
game traceable if it can be reached by the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm from
an open set of priors. As explained in Section 3.1, traceability in this sense corre-
sponds to a notion of sustainability suggested by Myerson (1997). Govindan and
Wilson (2003a) have shown that, generically, every equilibrium found by the global
Newton method has index +1. Proposition 3.1 then implies that only equilibria of
index +1 are traceable.
The converse question is if, generically, every equilibrium of index +1 is trace-
able. This question has been discussed in Hofbauer (2003) in the context of sus-
tainability. We answer it negatively by giving an analysis of coordination games.
Following Hofbauer (2003), we define a coordination game to be a square bimatrix
game (A,B), where the matrices A and B have zeros on the diagonal and negative
entries off the diagonal. We restrict our analysis to nondegenerate 3×3 coordina-
tion games. If such a game has a completely mixed equilibrium, this equilibrium
has index +1, and will be our candidate for non-traceability. In addition, such a
game has three pure strategy equilibria, also of index +1, and three equilibria of
52
Chapter 3. Equilibrium Tracing in Strategic-Form Games
support size two, which have index −1.
It is straightforward that in such a game, the Lemke-Howson algorithm only finds
the pure strategy equilibria. These equilibria are traced by the van den Elzen-
Talman method as well, by starting from any prior nearby. However, compared
to the Lemke-Howson method, the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm allows for a
vast variety of starting points. The question is if this increased flexibility suffices
to make the completely mixed equilibrium traceable as well. Hofbauer (2003)
answered this question negatively for symmetric games, which in general is cor-
rect only as long as we restrict the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm to symmetric
starting point. More precisely, in this section we show that the traceability of the
completely mixed equilibrium depends on the type of coordination game at hand.
On the one hand, we give a class of generic coordination games for which the com-
pletely mixed equilibrium is not traceable. This implies that the flexibility of the
van den Elzen-Talman algorithm does not ensure generic traceability of all equi-
libria of positive index.
On the other hand, we prove that there are coordination games for which the com-
pletely mixed equilibrium can indeed be traced from an open set of starting points.
Hence for this class of games, the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm is stronger
than the Lemke-Howson method, in the sense that the equilibria found by the lat-
ter method are a proper subset of the traceable equilibria. This strengthens known
observations that the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm in general finds more equi-
libria than the Lemke-Howson method. An example of an equilibrium found by the
van den Elzen-Talman algorithm but not by the Lemke-Howson method has been
given by van den Elzen and Talman (1991). However, the equilibrium considered
in their example has negative index, hence is only found via non-generic van den
Elzen-Talman paths and cannot be traceable.
We start our analysis of traceability in coordination games with the game given by
A =

0 −1 −1
−1 0 −1
−1 −1 0
= B> (3.5)
which corresponds to the “standard” coordination game usually given by the iden-
tity matrix. For this game, it is easy to see that the completely mixed equilibrium
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is not traceable. The van den Elzen-Talman paths in this example are quite sim-
ple; as soon as a path arrives in the “same” best reply regions for both players, the
corresponding pure strategy equilibrium is found, as depicted in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: A van den Elzen-Talman path for example (3.5). The dots denote
the prior, or starting point of the algorithm. The black arrows give the path of the
algorithm; the dashed triangles trace the value of the restricted strategy space ∆t
after the first step of the algorithm.
Consider the following perturbation of the standard coordination game (3.5):
A =

0 −1 −c
−c 0 −1
−1 −c 0
= B> (3.6)
where c > 0. We call such a game a c-coordination game. The edges between
any two best reply regions for this game are given by the points 11+c · (0,1,c), 11+c ·
(c,0,1) and 11+c · (1,c,0), each connected to (1/3,1/3,1/3). We will prove that
the slopes of those edges are crucial to whether the completely mixed equilibrium
in such a game is traceable or not. For 1 < c < 2, the edges are contained in the
darkly shaded areas in Figure 3.3. This implies that the smaller angle between any
of those edges and the boundary of the respective player’s strategy space is between
60◦ and 90◦. This property is crucial in the proof of the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.3. For any 1 < c < 2, the completely mixed equilibrium in the corre-
sponding 3×3 c-coordination game defined in (3.6) is not traceable. The same is
true for any small (possibly non-symmetric) perturbation of such a game.
We do not claim this result to be sharp. To the contrary, we would expect an
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Figure 3.3: For a c-coordination game, the edges between two best reply regions
are contained in the darkly shaded areas if 1 < c < 2, and in the lightly shaded
areas if c > 2.
analogous statement to be true for other suitable parameters c, for example 1/2 <
c≤ 1.
Proof. Fix a c-coordination game with 1< c< 2. We have to analyze the different
paths that can be generated by the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm by choosing
an arbitrary starting point (x,y). First, observe that it suffices to only consider non-
degenerate paths, i.e. paths without branch points or higher-dimensional degenera-
cies. This is essentially due to the fact that the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm can
be understood as a special case of Lemke’s algorithm, as explained in Section 3.2.
Hence van den Elzen-Talman paths can be seen as Lemke-paths, which for almost
all covering vectors will be nondegenerate as long as the underlying linear com-
plementarity problem is nondegenerate (Eaves, 1971). But since the coordination
games at hand are nondegenerate, the corresponding linear complementarity prob-
lem is nondegenerate as well (von Stengel, 2002).
Our proof is best understood by geometrically following the paths generated from
different starting points. For illustration we have done this for the last case in
Figure 3.4. We will describe the pivoting steps of possible paths using the concept
of “picking up” and “dropping” labels, as described in Section 3.2. Player one’s
strategies are labelled 1-3, and player two’s have labels 4-6. Recall that a point
(1− t)x+ x of player one’s restricted strategy space has as labels firstly the best
replies of player two against (1−t)x+x, and secondly his own “unused” strategies,
i.e. those i with xi = 0. The labels for a point in the restricted strategy space for
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player two are defined analogously. If we say that at some point a player picks
up or drops a label, we always mean this to be a label in the restricted strategy
space relevant at that point. Recall that ∆(i) denotes the ith best reply region. As
explained above, our choice of c∈ (1,2)means that the edges between any two best
reply regions are in the darkly shaded areas depicted in Figure 3.3. This property,
which we will refer to as Property (*) for the remainder of the proof, is essential
for the geometric structure of the van den Elzen-Talman paths.
Now choose a starting point (x,y) which generates a nondegenerate van den Elzen-
Talman path. We can assume without loss of generality that x ∈ ∆(4). As always in
a coordination game, if y ∈ ∆(1), the equilibrium (1,0,0),(1,0,0) is found straight
away. Next, assume that y ∈ ∆(2), and look at the different cases that may happen.
The case of y ∈ ∆(3) is symmetric (by rotating the strategy space and exchanging
the two players), hence there is no need to discuss it.
In the first step of the algorithm, the homotopy parameter starts growing, while both
players put weight on their respective best replies to the prior. Hence the first part of
the van den Elzen-Talman path is given by ((1−t) ·x+(0, t,0),(1−t) ·y+(t,0,0)).
This path is followed until a new label is picked up, i.e. until the path hits another
best reply region.
• If it hits ∆(5) or ∆(1) first, the corresponding pure strategy equilibrium is
found straight away, similarly as in Figure 3.2.
• If the path hits ∆(3) first, player two picks up label 3, which then player one
can drop. This means that player one starts putting positive weight on his
third strategy, while the homotopy parameter t needs to remain constant in
order to enable the players to keep all necessary labels. Since by Property
(*), the edge between ∆(4) and ∆(5) is steeper than the edge given by label 1
of player one’s restricted strategy simplex, the path cannot hit ∆(5) during
this process. If the path hits ∆(6), then the equilibrium (0,0,1),(0,0,1) is
found: Player two can drop label 6, which player one has just found, but
needs to keep labels 2, 3 and 5. Since by Property (*), the edge given by la-
bel 5 of player two’s restricted strategy simplex is contained in ∆(3), the only
way this can happen is if the homotopy parameter t starts shrinking, until
either of the players reaches the upper vertex of the restricted strategy sim-
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plex ∆t , where that player finds a label of his own. Assume this was player
one, picking up label 2 (the case for player two works vice versa). Then
player two can drop that label, i.e. leave the boundary between the best reply
regions, and walk towards the upper vertex of his restricted strategy simplex
(while the homotopy parameter stalls), until he picks up label 4. This in turn
implies that now player one can also leave the boundary of the best reply
regions. The homotopy parameter starts growing, while both players stay
in the upper corner of their restricted strategy spaces, until the equilibrium
(0,0,1),(0,0,1) is found.
The only remaining case is for the first player’s path to remain in ∆(4) un-
til he reaches the upper vertex (1− t) · x+(0,0, t) of his restricted strategy
simplex and picks up label 2. Then the homotopy parameter starts growing
again until one of the following cases occur:
(i) If the path hits ∆(1) first, then the equilibrium (1,0,0),(1,0,0) is found,
by an argument similar to Figure 3.2.
(ii) If the path hits ∆(6) first, then the equilibrium (0,0,1),(0,0,1) is found,
again by a similar argument.
(iii) If the path hits ∆(5) first, player one picks up label 5, which then player
two can drop. Then the homotopy parameter stalls while player two
puts more weight on his second strategy. At some point he arrives at
∆(2) again. Now player one can drop label 2, but needs to keep labels
1, 4 and 5. Since due to Property (*), the edge given by label 1 of player
one’s restricted strategy simplex is contained in ∆(5), the only way this
can happen is if the homotopy parameter starts shrinking, while both
players walk along the edge between the best reply regions they are
on, away from the barycenter (1/3,1/3,1/3). At some point, player
one reaches the right vertex of his restricted strategy simplex, picking
up label 3. This is bound to happen before player two reaches the left
vertex of his restricted strategy simplex: Due to the history of the al-
gorithm we can see that player two’s relevant vertex is further away
(in terms of the homotopy parameter) from the relevant boundary be-
tween best reply regions, than player one’s. Player two can now drop
label 3, i.e. leave ∆(3): While the homotopy parameter is stalling, he
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Figure 3.4: A van den Elzen-Talman-path as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. The
black line segments give the path of the algorithm, the dashed triangles trace the
restricted strategy space ∆t . The upper figure contains the first four steps of the
algorithm, the lower one traces the whole path in greater detail.
walks towards the right vertex of his restricted strategy simplex, where
he picks up label 4. Now player one can leave ∆(4), and the equilib-
rium (0,1,0),(0,1,0) is found. For visualization, we have provided a
graphic description of the last case in Figure 3.4.
So far we have proven that for any c-coordination game with 1 < c < 2, the com-
pletely mixed equilibrium is not traceable. However, it is easy to verify that for
any small (possibly non-symmetric) perturbation of such a c-coordination game,
the arguments above are still valid. Hence we can extend our result to small per-
turbations of such c-coordination games.
As an immediate consequence, we get the central result of this section:
Corollary 3.4. There is an open set in the space of 3×3 bimatrix games, such that
every game in that set has an equilibrium of index +1 that is not traceable.
We would like to conclude this section by proving that the mixed equilibrium of
a c-coordination game as in (3.6) is traceable as soon as c > 2. This is essentially
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due to the fact that for c > 2, the relevant angle of the edges between best reply
regions and the boundary of the strategy space becomes smaller than 60◦, i.e. those
edges are contained in the lightly shaded areas of Figure 3.3, as opposed to the
darkly shaded ones. This in turn implies that where the homotopy parameter t used
to shrink before, now it starts growing, which enables us to find the completely
mixed equilibrium.
Proposition 3.5. For any c > 2, the completely mixed equilibrium in the corre-
sponding 3×3 c-coordination game is traceable.
Proof. Choose a prior (x,y)∈ ∆(4)×∆(2) such that x is close to ∆(6) but far from
∆(5), while y is closer to ∆(3) than x is to ∆(5), but further away from ∆(3) than x
is from ∆(6). At the same time, let y be close to ∆(1). “Close” and “far” are to be
understood in terms of the homotopy parameter. It should become clear during the
description of the envisaged path what precisely is needed.
Finally, let y be such that the line from y to (1,0,0) intersects ∆(3). By these
choices, we can generate the following van den Elzen-Talman path: The path hits
∆(3) first, where player two picks up label 3. This means that player one can put
weight on his third strategy, while the homotopy parameter stalls, until his path
hits ∆(6). Now, player two can drop label 6 but needs to keep labels 2, 3 and 5.
Since c > 2, the edges between any two best reply regions have a different slope
than for the case where 1 < c < 2, as depicted in Figure 3.3. In particular, the
edge between ∆(2) and ∆(3) is steeper than the edge given by label 5 of player
two’s restricted strategy space. This implies that at this point of the algorithm,
player two’s restricted strategy simplex is still contained in ∆(2). This means that
unlike in the proof of Theorem 3.3, where in the analogous situation the homotopy
parameter started shrinking, the homotopy parameter now needs to grow in order
to enable player two to keep the necessary labels. Since player one needs to keep
labels 1, 4 and 6, he moves towards the barycenter (1/3,1/3,1/3) on the edge
between ∆(4) and ∆(6), while player 2 moves away from (1/3,1/3,1/3) on the
edge between ∆(2) and ∆(3). At some point, player one arrives at (1/3,1/3,1/3),
where he reaches ∆(5) and picks up label 5. By our choice of y “close” to ∆(1), we
can assume that at this point, the barycenter (1/3,1/3,1/3) is contained in player
two’s restricted strategy space. Player two can now drop label 5, i.e. put positive
weight on his second strategy, hence the homotopy parameter stalls and player two
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moves along the edge between ∆(2) and ∆(3) until he, too, reaches (1/3,1/3,1/3).
Now in turn player one can put positive weight on his first strategy. This implies
that the homotopy parameter can grow until it reaches 1, while both players remain
at the completely mixed equilibrium. Quite obviously, this path can be generated
from an open set of priors, hence the completely mixed equilibrium is traceable.
To conclude the proof, we give a numerical example of the path generated above:
For c = 3, from the starting point given by x = (45/100,35/100,20/100), y =
(15/100,40/100,45/100) the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm finds the completely
mixed equilibrium of the corresponding c-coordination game, via a path as de-
scribed above.
3.5 Open questions
The main open question that is raised by Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 is if similar
results hold for the global Newton method: Is there an equilibrium of index+1 that
is not found by the global Newton method, or more generally, is there an open set
of games such that each of these games has an equilibrium of index +1 that is not
traceable by the global Newton method? Due to Proposition 3.1, the latter result
would imply our Theorem 3.3.
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Index and Uniqueness of
Symmetric Equilibria
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we use constructions of polytopes to prove a theorem, conjectured
by Hofbauer (2003), about symmetric Nash equilibria of symmetric two-player
games. These games are important in evolutionary game theory, where a “mixed
strategy” represents the frequencies of individual “pure strategies” that are played
in a population.
In a strategic form game, a Nash equilibrium always exists but is not necessarily
unique. An enormous literature in game theory (van Damme, 1987) considers con-
cepts of equilibrium selection and refinement in order to suggest fewer, preferably
unique, equilibria as “solutions” to a given game. Typically, equilibria are selected
that are “stable” in some sense, for example under perturbations of the payoffs that
define the game (see Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, and the subsequent literature).
Hofbauer (2003) discusses various desirable properties of “sustainable” equilibria,
a concept suggested by Myerson (1997); often, these properties hold for the equi-
libria of index +1. For example, only equilibria of index +1 can be stable under
some “Nash field”, that is, a vector field on the set of mixed strategy profiles whose
rest points are the Nash equilibria.
Hofbauer (2003) conjectured that equilibria of index+1 are “potentially unique” in
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the sense that there is an extended game, with additional strategies for the players,
where the given equilibrium is unique. This has been proved for bimatrix games
in von Schemde (2005), with a constructive geometric proof in von Schemde and
von Stengel (2008). We prove the corresponding theorem for symmetric equilibria
of symmetric two-player games (for definitions see Section 4.2):
Theorem 4.1. For a nondegenerate symmetric d× d game (B>,B), a symmetric
equilibrium has symmetric index +1 if and only if it is the unique symmetric equi-
librium in an extended symmetric game (G>,G).
As explained in Chapter 2, the index of an equilibrium is an involved topological
notion. Theorem 4.1, however, characterizes the symmetric index in purely strate-
gic terms, without resorting to any concepts from topology. For d× n bimatrix
games (A,B), the analogous statement to Theorem 4.1 holds with the word “sym-
metric” omitted. (In this chapter we use d rather than m for the number of rows of
the game matrices because most of our geometric objects live in Rd .) This result
for bimatrix games was first proved in von Schemde (2005) using topological argu-
ments. The statements for bimatrix and symmetric games are independent because
for a symmetric game, the bimatrix game index may differ from the symmetric
index (we give an example after Definition 4.3 below). Also, the symmetric game
needs to be extended symmetrically, whereas in the bimatrix game setting, only
strategies for one player are added.
We prove Theorem 4.1 using polytopes. The symmetric game given in Theorem 4.1
is used to define a simplicial d-polytope. The polytope is labelled in the sense that
each vertex has a label in {1, . . . ,d}. A facet is completely labelled if the set of la-
bels of its d vertices is {1, . . . ,d}. The completely labelled facets correspond to the
symmetric equilibria of the game, and one “artificial equilibrium” associated with a
special facet F0. The orientation of a completely labelled facet is equal to the index
of the corresponding equilibrium, except for a change of sign in even dimension
(see Lemma 4.7). According to a standard “parity argument” (Papadimitriou, 1994)
known from the Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson, 1964; Shapley,
1974), completely labelled facets come in pairs of opposite orientation. We state
this result in Proposition 4.9 below. Its proof uses a very intuitive geometric argu-
ment, which relies heavily on the simpliciality of the polytope.
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The following is our central result in the polytope setting.
Theorem 4.2. Let P4 be a labelled simplicial d-polytope with 0 in its interior, and
let F0 and F be two completely labelled facets of opposite orientation. Then there
are labelled points such that the convex hull P4ext of these points and P4 has only
F0 and F as completely labelled facets.
The added points in Theorem 4.2 will be used to define the added strategies in
Theorem 4.1. In order to get from added points to added strategies, we intro-
duce a special class of bimatrix games, which we call unit vector games. A unit
vector game is a bimatrix game where the columns of the first player’s payoff ma-
trix are unit vectors. This concept generalizes the imitation games introduced by
McLennan and Tourky (2007), where the first player’s payoff matrix is the identity
matrix. We show that each labelled simplicial polytope P4 corresponds to a unit
vector game; the completely labelled facets of P4 correspond to the equilibria of
this game (see Lemma 4.10). For the labelled polytope P4 defined from a symmet-
ric game (B>,B), the corresponding unit vector game is the imitation game (I,B).
Hence Lemma 4.10 generalizes the result from McLennan and Tourky (2007) that
the symmetric equilibria of (B>,B) are in one-to-one correspondence to the equi-
libria of (I,B).
Starting from a symmetric game (B>,B), we use Theorem 4.2 to add points to the
corresponding labelled polytope P4. These added points can be used to extend
the corresponding imitation game (I,B) to a unit vector game, by adding strategies
for the column player. We then have to symmetrize this game, by adding suit-
able payoff rows. The added rows are essentially given by the payoffs of the first
player in the extended game (see Lemma 4.11). This is the crucial step for deriving
Theorem 4.1 from Theorem 4.2.
This Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2 we give a short exposition of
symmetric games and the symmetric index. Section 4.3 explains how symmetric
games are linked to labelled polytopes. Symmetric equilibria of a symmetric game
correspond to completely labelled facets of the underlying polytope. Section 4.4
introduces the natural concept of an orientation of such a completely labelled facet,
which up to a dimension-dependent sign coincides with the symmetric index of
the corresponding symmetric equilibrium. In Section 4.5 we introduce unit vector
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games, and show how to use these to derive our main result, Theorem 4.1, from its
geometric counterpart, Theorem 4.2.
In the subsequent sections, we give a constructive proof of Theorem 4.2, the main
idea of which goes back to a proof sketch of a related result in the non-symmetric
setting by von Schemde and von Stengel (2008). However, the authors omit crucial
details, and their proof sketch relies on results about polytopes which we prove in
this chapter. Section 4.6 describes a central concept for our construction, the “P-
matrix prism”, which is a particular type of completely labelled polytope with only
two completely labelled facets. A known result on P-matrices allows us to prove
Theorem 4.2 using a “stack” of three P-matrix prisms. For this to work, we need
to re-arrange the polytope P4 in a suitable way; this is done in Section 4.7. In
Section 4.8 we use a stack of P-matrix prisms to prove Theorem 4.2 for the case
that the two given completely labelled facets are disjoint. The non-disjoint case
will be treated in Section 4.9. The final Section 4.10 mentions open problems.
This chapter is joint work with Bernhard von Stengel.
4.2 The symmetric index
A symmetric game is a bimatrix game (B>,B) for a square matrix B (denoting the
payoffs to the column player), that is, the game remains unchanged if the players
are exchanged. A symmetric equilibrium of a symmetric game is an equilibrium of
the form (x,x), where both players use the same mixed strategy. Any symmetric
game has a symmetric equilibrium (Nash, 1951). A symmetric game may also have
non-symmetric equilibria, but in certain situations - i.e. if the players have no way
of determining which of the two possible player positions they are in - only the
symmetric equilibria are considered. Symmetric games and equilibria have been
studied in a variety of contexts, especially in evolutionary game theory (see, for
example, Gale et al., 1950, or Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
Savani and von Stengel (2006) introduced a symmetric version of the Lemke-
Howson algorithm. Following Shapley (1974), this algorithm can be used to define
a symmetric version of the index, as follows: Consider a nondegenerate symmetric
game (B>,B) with B > 0, and a symmetric equilibrium (x,x), and let Bxx be the
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square matrix obtained from B by deleting all rows and columns not in the support
of x. As in Section 1.3, nondegeneracy implies that this matrix Bxx has full rank.
The symmetric index of a symmetric equilibrium can now be defined analogously
to the “ordinary” index:
Definition 4.3. Let (B>,B) be a nondegenerate symmetric game with B > 0 and
let (x,x) be a symmetric equilibrium with k = |supp(x)|. The symmetric index of
(x,x) is defined as
(−1)k+1sign det(Bxx) (4.1)
In analogy to the non-symmetric case, the symmetric version of the index has
a straightforward interpretation in terms of the symmetric Lemke-Howson algo-
rithm: Symmetric equilibria at opposite ends of Lemke-Howson paths have oppo-
site symmetric index (Garcia and Zangwill, 1981). Like for the “ordinary” index,
there are multiple ways of defining the symmetric index; for example, a version of
the symmetric index based on the Poincare´ index of the replicator dynamics has
been suggested in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998).
In a symmetric bimatrix game, the “ordinary” index (as in Definition 4.3) is in
general different from the symmetric index. For example, the symmetric 2× 2
game (A,B) of “chicken”, where A = B = [e2 e1], has two non-symmetric pure
equilibria and a mixed equilibrium which is the only symmetric equilibrium. That
mixed equilibrium has index −1 for the bimatrix game, but symmetric index +1.
The symmetric index has the following properties, which require that its sign alter-
nates with the parity of the support size as in (4.1) (compare Proposition 2.3 or (von
Schemde and von Stengel, 2008, Proposition 2) for the corresponding statement for
the “ordinary” index).
Proposition 4.4. In a nondegenerate symmetric game, the symmetric index of a
symmetric equilibrium
(a) is +1 or −1;
(b) does not change when adding a positive constant to all payoffs;
(c) only depends on the payoffs in the support of the symmetric equilibrium;
(d) does not depend on the order of the players’ pure strategies;
(e) is +1 for any pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium; and
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(f) the sum of the symmetric indices over all symmetric equilibria is +1.
The proof of this proposition works analogously to the proof of the corresponding
properties of the “ordinary index” (see, for example, von Schemde and von Stengel,
2008). As mentioned, (a) holds because the game is nondegenerate and Bxx has
therefore full rank. It is easy to see that for a square matrix C and scalar s, the
determinant det(C + sE) is a linear function of s, which is not constant if C is
nonsingular, and does not change sign if s ≥ 0 and C > 0. This implies (b), and it
is the reason why we require that B > 0 in Definition 4.3.
In Proposition 4.4, claim (c) holds by definition, and shows that the index does
not change when considering the equilibrium in an extended game with additional
strategies (which are not played in the equilibrium). Condition (d) holds because
rows and columns are exchanged equally to maintain the symmetry of the game.
Property (e) is desirable, as discussed in Myerson (1997) and Hofbauer (2003),
because pure-strategy equilibria are particularly convincing solutions to a game.
Property (f) follows from a “parity argument” that we will prove in Proposition 4.9.
It implies that a unique symmetric equilibrium must have index +1.
An example is the “coordination game” with the d×d identity matrix I as payoff
matrix (its payoffs are only nonnegative, and not all positive, but Definition 4.3 still
applies). In this game, any nonempty set S ⊆ {1, . . . ,d} of pure strategies defines
a symmetric equilibrium (x,x) with supp(x) = S and x as the uniform distribution
on S. Its symmetric index is +1 if |S| is odd, otherwise −1.
4.3 Polytopes and symmetric equilibria
Polyhedra have been used since Vorob’ev (1958) to represent equilibria of bimatrix
games. Consider a nondegenerate d× n bimatrix game with payoff matrix B =
[b1 · · ·bn] for player 2. (A special case is a symmetric d× d game (B>,B) with
n = d.) Assume that the polyhedron
P = {x ∈ Rd | x≥ 0, x>B≤ 1>} (4.2)
is bounded. Recall that P is called a best reply polytope. Any x in P−{0} is
interpreted as a mixed strategy x/1>x of player 1. Any tight inequality x>b j ≤ 1
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describes a pure best reply j against x with payoff 1/1>x (because any column
other than j gives at most that payoff).
We require that P is bounded for the following reason (see also von Stengel (2002,
Fig. 2.5) for a more detailed geometric interpretation): P is bounded if and only if
the function x 7→ 1>x is bounded on P. Equivalently, player 2’s best-reply payoff to
any mixed strategy x is always positive, because x>b j ≤ 0 for all columns b j of B
would imply that x · t ∈ P for arbitrarily large scalars t > 0. Clearly, P is bounded
if B > 0, but possibly also when some entries of B are negative, as in the following
example:
B =
(
1/2 −1/3
−1/4 1
)
, P = conv
{(
0
0
)
,
(
2
0
)
,
(
0
1
)
,
(
3
2
)}
(4.3)
Here, the three vertices of P other than 0 represent the pure strategies of player 1
and the mixed strategy (3/5,2/5)>. For the symmetric game (B>,B), these three
vertices define symmetric equilibria, the pure ones with payoffs 1/2 and 1, respec-
tively, and the mixed one with payoff 1/5.
We will always start with a matrix B > 0, but will later add inequalities x>b ≤ 1
to P with vectors b that may have negative entries. This is allowed because then
P stays bounded. The columns b, and suitable rows, will be added to the payoff
matrix to obtain an extended game.
Because the given d× n game is nondegenerate, no mixed strategy x of player 1
has more than |supp(x)| pure best replies. Equivalently, no more than d inequalities
in (4.2) are tight for any x in P. This means that P is a simple polytope, and that
none of the inequalities x>b j is redundant in the sense that it can be omitted without
changing the polytope (except when it defines the empty face, which means that the
respective pure strategy j is never a best reply; then the jth column can be omitted
from the game). We assume that the game is nondegenerate, so P is simple, and
each binding inequality of P in (4.2) defines a facet.
Recall that each facet of P gets a label as follows. For 1≤ i≤ d, the facet {x ∈ P |
xi = 0} gets label i. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the facet {x ∈ P | x>b j = 1} gets label j. Any
point x in P has the labels of the facets it lies on.
Consider a symmetric game (B>,B), where n = d, and a point x in P−{0}, which
corresponds to a mixed strategy x′ = x/1>x. Then a label i of x represents either
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an unplayed strategy of player 1 (when xi = 0), or a best reply of player 2 (x>bi =
1). Hence, by the best reply condition, the mixed strategy pair (x′,x′) defines a
symmetric equilibrium if and only if x is completely labelled.
The vertex 0 of P is completely labelled, but it does not define an equilibrium.
However, 0 serves as a starting point for a symmetric version of the Lemke-Howson
algorithm (Savani and von Stengel, 2006, p. 402). The symmetric Lemke-Howson
algorithm computes a path of edges of P which starts at a completely labelled
vertex of P, for example 0, and ends at a different completely labelled vertex. The
endpoints of any Lemke-Howson path have opposite symmetric index, where 0 has
index −1 in agreement with (4.1) when k = 0. This implies Proposition 4.4(f). We
prove a dual version of this observation in Proposition 4.9.
We will use the polar (or dual) polytope P4 instead of P. Suppose Q is a polytope,
Q = {x ∈ Rd | x>ci ≤ 1, 1≤ i≤ k} (4.4)
with vectors c1, . . . ,ck in Rd . Then the polar (Ziegler, 1995) of Q is given by
Q4 = conv{c1, . . . ,ck} (4.5)
The polytope P in (4.2) has to be translated in order to have 0 in its interior so that it
can be written in the form (4.4). Moreover, it is convenient to have the negative unit
vectors−ei as vertices of P4, by translating P to the polytope P′ = {x−1 | x ∈ P}.
Then 0 is in the interior of P′ if 1 is in the interior of P (like in the example (4.3)),
that is, if
1>b j < 1 for 1≤ j ≤ n (4.6)
This can be assumed without loss of generality by multiplying all payoffs in B with
a suitably small positive constant, which does not change the game.
Then x′ ∈ P′ = {x−1 | x ∈ P} if and only if x′+1≥ 0 and (x′+1)>B≤ 1, that is,
−x′i ≤ 1 for 1≤ i≤ d and x′>b j/(1−1>b j)≤ 1 for 1≤ j ≤ n. Writing P4 instead
of P′4, we therefore obtain
P4 = conv({−e1, . . . ,−ed}∪{b j/(1−1>b j) | 1≤ j ≤ n}) (4.7)
The facets of P4 correspond to the vertices of P and vice versa (Ziegler, 1995).
The polytope P4 is simplicial (i.e. every facet has exactly d vertices) because P
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is simple. The labels of the facets of P become labels of the vertices of P4. By
construction, these vertices are −ei with label i for 1 ≤ i ≤ d, and b j/(1− 1>b j)
with label j for 1≤ j ≤ n.
The facet corresponding to the vertex 0 of P is given by
F0 = conv{−e1, . . . ,−ed} (4.8)
Because F0 = {x ∈ P4 | −1>x = 1}, the normal vector of F0 is −1, which is the
vertex of P′ that is the translated vertex 0 of P.
In general, a facet F of P4 has normal vector v if F = {x ∈ P4 | v>x = 1} and
v>x ≤ 1 is valid for all x in P4. The normal vectors of facets F other than F0
represent mixed strategies, as follows.
Lemma 4.5. Let F 6= F0 be a facet of P4 in (4.7) with normal vector v. Then
v represents the mixed strategy x = (v+ 1)/1>(v+ 1), and xi = 0 if and only if
−ei ∈ F for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Any other label j of F, so that b j/(1− 1>b j) is a vertex
of F, represents a pure best reply to x.
Proof. This holds because the polar of the polar is the original polytope (Ziegler,
1995). More precisely, P44 is P′ above, so the normal vector v = (v1, . . . ,vd)> is
a vertex of P′ and thus v+1 is a vertex of P in (4.2). If −ei ∈ F , then vi =−1 and
therefore xi = 0, and vice versa.
Lemma 4.5 means that the labels of a facet F of P4, whose normal vector rep-
resents a mixed strategy x, are the unplayed pure strategies in x or the pure best
replies to x. Observe that by nondegeneracy, every symmetric equilibrium (x,x) of
(B>,B) gives rise to a facet of P4 whose normal is x−1, suitably scaled. Together
with the following result, this implies that the symmetric equilibria of (B>,B) are
in one-to-one correspondence with the completely labelled facets of P4:
Corollary 4.6. Let F 6= F0 be a facet of P4 in (4.7) with normal vector v, and let
x = (v+1)/1>(v+1) as in Lemma 4.5. Then (x,x) is a symmetric equilibrium of
(B>,B) if and only if F has all labels 1, . . . ,d.
Proof. An equilibrium (x,x) is given by those mixed strategies x so that for all
i = 1, . . . ,d, either xi = 0 (that is, −ei with label i is a vertex of F) or i is a best
reply to x. By Lemma 4.5, this means F has all labels.
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A more direct representation of mixed strategies as normal vectors of facets has
been considered in Ba´ra´ny et al. (2005). The representation uses an unbounded
polyhedron rather than a polytope, as follows. Consider the columns b j of B as
points in Rd and let the polyhedron ˆP be the nonnegative convex hull of these
points; that is, ˆP is the intersection of all halfspaces with nonnegative normal vec-
tors that contain all points b1, . . . ,bn. Then a normal vector x of any facet of ˆP, is,
suitably scaled, a mixed strategy where the points b j that lie on the facet are the
pure best replies j to x. By construction, the polytope P4 is, with the exception
of the additional facet F0, combinatorially equivalent to the polyhedron ˆP. The
vertices b j of ˆP are scaled to become vertices of P4 in (4.7).
We will later enlarge P4 by adding points c so that (among other things) F0 remains
a facet of conv(P4∪{c}), that is,−1>c< 1. These points correspond to additional
columns b of the game matrix B given by
b = c/(1+1>c) (4.9)
because then b/(1−1>b) = c in agreement with (4.7).
4.4 Oriented facets
Considering the simplicial polytope P4 in (4.7) rather than the simple polytope
P in (4.2) has the advantage that orientations of facets are easily defined and vi-
sualized. If F is a completely labelled facet of P4, we assume that its vertices
a1, . . . ,ad are given in the order of their labels, that is, ai has label i, for 1≤ i≤ d.
Then the orientation of F is
sign det[a1 · · ·ad ] (4.10)
The orientation of F coincides with the symmetric index of the corresponding sym-
metric equilibrium, except for a change of sign in even dimension:
Lemma 4.7. Let (B>,B) be a nondegenerate symmetric d× d game, and let P4
be the polytope in (4.7) with n = d. Then the orientation of a completely labelled
facet F of P4, multiplied by (−1)d+1, is the symmetric index of the correspond-
ing symmetric equilibrium, where F0 corresponds to the artificial equilibrium with
index −1.
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Proof. When F = F0, then its orientation is sign det (−I) with the negative identity
matrix −I, which is +1 when d is even and −1 when d is odd.
Let (x,x) be a symmetric equilibrium of (B>,B), and let F = conv{a1, . . . ,ad}
be the corresponding completely labelled facet of P4. Here, ai has label i for
1≤ i≤ d, where ai =−ei if i 6∈ supp(x) by Lemma 4.5, and a j = b j/(1−1>b j) for
j ∈ supp(x). For the sign of the determinant, we can ignore the scalar 1/(1−1>b j),
which is positive by (4.6). Hence, with k = |supp(x)|,
sign det[a1, . . . ,ad ] = sign (−1)d−k det(Bxx) = (−1)d+1(−1)k+1sign det(Bxx)
which proves the claim.
In general, the orientation of a nonsingular matrix is the sign of its determinant.
When a facet is not completely labelled, there is no natural order of writing down
its vertices as columns of a matrix. However, two adjacent facets share d − 1
vertices, so by keeping these d− 1 columns fixed, the respective matrices differ
in only one column. The following lemma states that these matrices have opposite
orientation. It is very intuitive in low dimension, which suggests its straightforward
proof.
Lemma 4.8. Consider a simplicial d-polytope with 0 in its interior, and two adja-
cent facets with vertices b,a2, . . . ,ad and c,a2, . . . ,ad , respectively. Then [b a2 · · ·ad ]
and [c a2 · · ·ad] have opposite orientation.
Proof. We show that there are positive reals s and t so that bs+ ct is in the linear
span of a2, . . . ,ad . Then
0 = det[bs+ ct a2 · · ·ad] = s ·det[b a2 · · ·ad ]+ t ·det[c a2 · · ·ad ]
which implies that det[b a2 · · ·ad] and det[c a2 · · ·ad ] have opposite sign as claimed;
the determinants are nonzero because the hyperplanes through the two facets do not
contain 0.
Let s, t, and r2, . . . ,rd be reals, not all zero, so that
bs+ ct +
d
∑
i=2
airi = 0 (4.11)
where clearly s 6= 0, t 6= 0, and w.l.o.g. s > 0. Let v and w be the normal vectors to
the two facets, so that v>ai = 1, v>b= 1, v>c< 1 and w>ai = 1, w>c= 1, w>b< 1,
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for 2 ≤ i ≤ d. Then multiplying (4.11) with both v> and w> gives v>(bs+ ct) =
w>(bs+ct), that is, (1−w>b)s=(1−v>c)t and thus t =(1−w>b)s/(1−v>c)> 0
where by (4.11) bs+ ct is in the linear span of a2, . . . ,ad .
The following observation is proved with the path-following algorithm of Lemke
and Howson (1964), in its symmetric form (Savani and von Stengel, 2006, p. 402),
applied to the polar polytope of P in (4.2). It is the classic form of a “polyno-
mial parity argument with direction” that defines the computational class PPAD
(Papadimitriou, 1994). It is similar to the well-known proof by Cohen (1967) of
Sperner’s Lemma (Sperner, 1928). We give a simplified version of the proof by
Shapley (1974) that is based on exchanging columns of determinants. Lemke and
Grotzinger (1976) give a similar proof based on abstract orientations of simplices
in an oriented pseudo-manifold (see also Eaves and Scarf (1976), and Todd (1976),
for orientation and index methods in the context of simplicial concepts).
Proposition 4.9. In a labelled simplicial d-polytope with 0 in its interior, the com-
pletely labelled facets come in pairs of opposite orientation.
Proof. Consider all facets that have all labels except possibly label 1. This in-
cludes any completely labelled facet, which we write as a matrix [a1 · · ·ad] where
vertex ai of the facet has label i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. The other facets have vertices
bi,a2, . . . ,ai, . . . ,ad , where a j has label j for 2 ≤ j ≤ n and bi has the duplicate
label i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}. For these facets, we consider the two matrices
[bi a2 · · · ai · · · ad] and [ai a2 · · · ai−1 bi ai+1 · · · ad ] (4.12)
which have determinants of opposite sign. Consider all these matrices as nodes of a
bipartite graph, with the matrices of negative determinant in one partition class and
those of positive determinant in the other. Connect the two matrices in (4.12) by a
“blue” edge. Secondly, join any other two matrices by a “red” edge if they have the
same last d−1 columns. This defines two adjacent facets. Their common d− 1
columns are not contained in any other matrix. By Lemma 4.8, the two matrices
have opposite orientation, so the graph is indeed bipartite.
Every node in that graph has degree one or two. Any such graph is a collection of
paths and cycles. The nodes of degree one, which are the endpoints of the paths,
correspond to completely labelled facets and are only incident to a red edge. The
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other nodes are also incident to a blue edge. Any path starts and ends with a red
edge and is of odd length because the colors of the edges on the path alternate.
Hence, the endpoints of any path have opposite orientation, as claimed.
a
b
b
1
a
3
2
3
b2
1a
Figure 4.1: Example of the path-following argument used to show Proposi-
tion 4.9. A vertex ai or bi has label i.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the preceding proof for d = 3. Each vertex ai or bi has label
i in {1,2,3}. There is only a single path, which we start at [a1 a2 a3] which cor-
responds to a completely labelled facet with negative orientation (clockwise order
of a1,a2,a3). That path ends at [b1 a2 b3], oriented positively (anticlockwise). The
path corresponds to the following sequence of matrices, with alternating orienta-
tion, and red edges shown with “→”: [a1 a2 a3]→ [b2 a2 a3], [a2 b2 a3]→ [b3 b2 a3],
[a3 b2 b3]→ [a2 b2 b3], [b2 a2 b3]→ [b1 a2 b3]. Only “red” edges are shown in Fig-
ure 4.1, as arrows from a matrix with negative to one with positive orientation, so
a facet as in (4.12) where label 1 is missing is both endpoint and starting point of a
red arrow; the “blue” edges just refer to an exchange of matrix columns.
The change from one simplicial facet to another is equivalent to a pivoting step
as used in the simplex algorithm (Dantzig, 1963). The described paths may be
exponentially long (Morris, 1994).
A dual best reply polytope P4 has the completely labelled facet F0, and therefore
by Proposition 4.9 at least one other completely labelled facet F . This implies
that every nondegenerate symmetric game has at least one symmetric equilibrium.
(This is also true for degenerate games, with additional considerations.)
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4.5 From unit vector to symmetric games
In this section, we show how Theorem 4.2 implies Theorem 4.1. Given a non-
degenerate d× d symmetric game (B>,B), we consider the labelled polytope P4
in (4.7). Then the symmetric equilibrium of index +1 considered in Theorem 4.1
corresponds to a completely labelled facet F which has opposite orientation to F0.
According to Theorem 4.2, there are additional points c in Rd so that the con-
vex hull P4ext of these points and of P4 has only F and F0 as completely labelled
facets. Using (4.9), the added points correspond to added columns of the matrix B
which then has n columns for some n ≥ d. Furthermore, these points have labels
in {1, . . . ,d}. The following lemma shows how these labels can be used to define
a bimatrix game whose equilibria correspond to the completely labelled facets of
the extended polytope P4ext.
Lemma 4.10. Consider a labelled simplicial d-polytope Q with 0 in its interior,
spanned by a set of vertices
{−e1, . . . ,−ed ,c1, . . . ,cn}
so that F0 in (4.8) is a facet of Q. Let−ei have label i for 1≤ i≤ d, and let c j have
label l( j) ∈ {1, . . . ,d} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let (U,B) be the d× n bimatrix game with
U = [el(1) · · · el(n)] and B = [b1 · · · bn], where b j = c j/(1+ 1>c j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Then the completely labelled facets F of Q, with the exception of F0, are in one-
to-one correspondence to the Nash equilibria (x,y) of the game (U,B), where x
corresponds to F as in Lemma 4.5, and y is a suitable unit distribution.
Proof. Consider a facet F of Q so that F = conv({−ei | i∈K}∪{c j | j ∈ J}) 6= F0.
Let v be the normal vector to F , and let x = (v+ 1)/1>(v+ 1) as in Lemma 4.5.
Then x is a mixed strategy of player 1, which has support {1, . . . ,d}−K, a set of
size |J|. Furthermore, J is the set of pure best replies to x by player 2, who has
payoff matrix B.
In order to obtain an equilibrium (x,y) of (U,B) for some mixed strategy y ∈ Rn
of player 2, only best replies may be played with positive probability xi or y j. For
player 2, this means that y j > 0 only if j ∈ J. For player 1, we need |J| pure
best replies. Because the columns of player 1’s payoff matrix U are unit vectors,
this works only if y j = 1/|J| for j ∈ J and y j = 0 otherwise, and if for every i ∈
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supp(x) = {1, . . . ,d}−K, there is some j ∈ J so that i = l( j) because then column
j of U is the unit vector el( j). This is exactly the condition that the set of labels
of F , namely K ∪{l( j) | j ∈ J}, is {1, . . . ,d}, that is, F is completely labelled, as
claimed.
The bimatrix game (U,B) considered in the previous lemma may be called a unit
vector game, that is, all columns of player 1’s payoff matrix U are suitable unit
vectors. A special case is an imitation game (I,B) where B is a square matrix
and I is the identity matrix. Imitation games have been introduced by McLennan
and Tourky (2007), who showed that the symmetric equilibria (x,x) of a symmet-
ric game (B>,B) are in one-to-one correspondence with the equilibria (x,y) of the
imitation game (I,B), where y is the uniform distribution on supp(x). This obser-
vation can be used to apply computational hardness results about symmetric games
to bimatrix games. Furthermore, the symmetric index of (x,x) is equal to the index
of (x,y) in the bimatrix game (I,B).
The following lemma provides the main step for deriving Theorem 4.1 from The-
orem 4.2. It explains how to get from a particular extension of an imitation game
(I,B) to a symmetric extension of the corresponding symmetric game (B>,B).
Lemma 4.11. Consider d×d matrices I and B, where I is the identity matrix, and
d× k matrices U and B′, where all columns of U are unit vectors, and let
G =
(
B B′
U> 0
)
(4.13)
Then any symmetric equilibrium (z,z) of (G>,G) gives rise to a Nash equilibrium
(x,y) of the unit vector game ([I U ], [B B′]), where xi = zi/∑ds=1 zs for 1 ≤ i ≤ d
and y is a suitable uniform distribution, whose support is contained in {1, . . . ,d} if
and only if the support of z is.
Proof. Let U = [el(1) · · · el(k)], and consider the support of z with the two sets
S = { i | zi > 0, 1≤ i≤ d}, T = { j | zd+ j > 0, 1≤ j ≤ k} (4.14)
If S was empty, only the rows d+ j for j ∈ T of player 2’s payoff matrix G would
be played with positive probability when player 1 uses z. However, by (4.13) each
such row [e>l( j) 0
>] has a single payoff 1 in one of the first d columns, and zeros
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elsewhere, so no column of the form d+ j would be a best reply against z and (z,z)
would not be an equilibrium of (G>,G). So S 6= /0, and x is well defined as the
re-scaled vector (z1, . . . ,zd)>.
We can assume that the unit vectors el( j) for j ∈ T are all distinct. Otherwise, if
el( j) = el( j′) for some j, j′ ∈ T and j 6= j′, we could replace z by a mixed strategy zˆ
which agrees with z except that zˆd+ j = zd+ j + zd+ j′ and zˆd+ j′ = 0, so that j′ can be
omitted from T . The two mixed strategies z and zˆ give the same expected payoffs,
z>G= zˆ>G, and give rise to the same strategy x, but zˆ has smaller support (this can
only occur in degenerate games).
In the unit vector game ([I U ], [B B′]), the pure best replies to player 1’s mixed
strategy x include (and in a nondegenerate game are exactly) the following columns:
d+ j for all j ∈ T , because the last k columns of x>[B B′] and of z>G are the same
except for the factor ∑ds=1 zs. Secondly, any column i in
R = S\{l( j) | j ∈ T} (4.15)
is a best reply to x, because for 1≤ i≤ d the ith entry of x>[B B′] is (z>G)i/∑ds=1 zs
if i 6∈ {l( j) | j ∈ T} (in particular, i ∈ R), or ((z>G)i− zd+ j)/∑ds=1 zs if i = l( j) for
some j ∈ T . In the latter case, the variable zd+ j is a “slack variable” for player 2’s
payoff in column l( j), so if this column is a best reply to z, it is no longer a best
reply to x.
The set of pure best replies to x therefore contains R∪{d+ j | j ∈ T}, which has
the same size as the support S of x. Player 2’s mixed strategy y in the unit vector
game with yl = 1/|S| for l ∈ R∪{d+ j | j ∈ T} and yl = 0 otherwise is therefore a
best reply to x. Against y, player 1, who has payoff matrix [I U ] in the unit vector
game, receives payoff 1/|S| for each row i in R (via the ith column of I), and payoff
1/|S| for each row i = l( j) for some j ∈ T (via the jth column el( j) of U). These
are exactly the rows in the support S of x. All other rows give expected payoff zero
against y. So x is a best reply to y, and (x,y) is an equilibrium of ([I U ], [B B′]), as
claimed.
Assuming that Theorem 4.2 holds, we use the preceding lemma to prove our main
result, Theorem 4.1, as follows.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let (B>,B) be a nondegenerate d×d game with symmetric
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equilibrium (x,x) of symmetric index +1, and let P4 be the dual best reply poly-
tope in (4.7) with n = d. By Lemma 4.7, x corresponds to a completely labelled
facet F of P4 with opposite orientation to F0. By Theorem 4.2, we can add a set
of vertices c1, . . . ,ck to P4, where each c j has some label l( j) in {1, . . . ,d} for
1≤ j ≤ k, so that the labelled polytope P4ext = conv(P4∪{c1, . . . ,ck}) has only F
and F0 as completely labelled facets. Let U = [el(1) · · ·el(k)], and let the jth col-
umn of the d× k matrix B′ be c j/(1+1>c j), for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. By Lemma 4.10, any
completely labelled facet of Q, with the exception of F0, corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium of ([I U ], [B B′]). Hence, the only such Nash equilibrium is (x,y)
where yi = 1/|supp(x)| for i ∈ supp(x) and yi = 0 otherwise, which corresponds
to the given symmetric equilibrium (x,x) of (B>,B). Then (x,x) extended to the
symmetric game (G>,G) with G as in (4.13) is the unique symmetric equilibrium
of (G>,G), because by Lemma 4.11, any other symmetric equilibrium would give
rise to a different Nash equilibrium of ([I U ], [B B′]).
4.6 P-matrix prisms
In the remaining sections, we prove Theorem 4.2. We use a class of matrices that
allows us to construct polytopes with known completely labelled facets. These are
the P-matrices, which are known from mathematical programming, in particular
for linear complementarity problems (Cottle et al., 1992). A d×d matrix A is a P-
matrix if all its principal minors are positive; a principal minor of A is a determinant
of the form det(ASS) for any subset S of {1, . . . ,d}, where ASS is the submatrix of
A obtained by deleting all rows and columns of A that are not in S.
P-matrices are useful for our purposes because they allow the construction of a
particular type of labelled polytope, the “P-matrix prism”, which has only two
completely labelled facets. Here we use the notion of prism in a very general sense
to denote the convex hull of two parallel simplices. Johnson et al. (2003) show that
every matrix of positive index can be written as the product of three P-matrices.
Given two completely labelled facets of a labelled simplicial polytope of opposite
orientation, we can use this matrix decomposition to create a “stack” of three P-
matrix prisms between the two facets. These prisms are placed such that each pair
of intersecting prisms meets in a pair of completely labelled facets. Since each
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prism only has two completely labelled facets, the only completely labelled facets
of the final stack of three prisms are the two given facets of the original polytope
(see Figure 4.2 in Section 4.7 for a graphic illustration of the idea).
In order for this approach to work we need to resolve two problems. First, for a
general P-matrix, we cannot prove that the corresponding P-matrix prism has only
two completely labelled facets. Hence we need to restrict the class of P-matrices
considered. This leads to the second issue: We need to change the decomposition
result in Johnson et al. (2003) to hold for this restricted class of P-matrices. In this
section, we deal with these two problems (Theorem 4.12 resolves the first issue,
and Proposition 4.13 the second); we restrict ourselves to P-matrices which are
permutation-similar to upper triangular matrices.
For a permutation pi of {1, . . . ,d}, the corresponding permutation matrix is the ma-
trix Epi = [epi(1) · · ·epi(d)]>, i.e. the matrix whose ith row is given by the pi(i)th
unit vector. Multiplying a matrix A = [a1 · · ·ad ] by E−1pi from the right yields
AE−1pi = [api(1) · · ·api(d)], i.e. permutes the columns by pi . Multiplying a matrix
A = [a1 · · ·ad ]> from the left by Epi yields EpiA = [api(1) · · ·api(d)]>, which means
that the rows are permuted by pi . Two d×d matrices A,B are permutation-similar
if there is a permutation matrix Epi such that B= EpiAE−1pi , i.e. B is obtained from A
by permuting both the rows and columns of A by pi . A matrix that is permutation-
similar to a P-matrix is again a P-matrix.
For a matrix C, let conv(C) be the convex hull of its column vectors. Because
we reserve the letters P and Q for polytopes, we denote P-matrices by letters like
R,S,T .
Theorem 4.12. Let R be a d× d matrix that is permutation-similar to an upper
triangular P-matrix (i.e. an upper triangular matrix with positive diagonal entries),
and that satisfies R>1= λ1 where λ 6= 1. Then the polytope P := conv[I , R], where
ei and ri have label i, only has the two “trivial” completely labelled facets conv(I)
and conv(R).
Proof. First, assume that R = [r1, . . . ,rd] is an upper triangular P-matrix. We
will prove the claim using induction on the dimension d of the polytope P. For
d = 2, the claim is obvious. For d > 2, consider the polytope generated by the
points e1, . . . ,ed−1,r1, . . . ,rd−1. This polytope P′ is contained in the hyperplane
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{x∈Rd |xd = 0}, hence its dimension is less than d. By the induction hypothesis we
can conclude that the only completely labelled facets of P′ are conv{e1, . . . ,ed−1}
and conv{r1, . . . ,rd−1}.
Hence the only non-trivial completely labelled facets of conv[I , P] could be the
ones containing the vertices e1, . . . ,ed−1,rd or r1, . . . ,rd−1,ed . Let us first prove
that there is no facet containing the first set of points. The points e1, . . . ,ed−1,rd
are affinely independent, and span a hyperplane given by {x | v>x = 1}, where v is
of the form (1, . . . ,1,x) for
x =
1− rd1−·· ·− rd(d−1)
λ − rd1−·· ·− rd(d−1)
The denominator does not vanish since λ−rd1−·· ·−rd(d−1)= rdd > 0 by assump-
tion. If λ > 1 (or < 1) then v>ed = x< 1 (or > 1). Since v>ri = λ for 1≤ i≤ d−1
this means that r1, . . . ,rd−1 and ed are on opposite sides of the hyperplane spanned
by e1, . . . ,ed−1,rd , hence the latter set of points cannot be contained in a facet.
If the polytope conv[I , R] is simplicial we are done, since then by Proposition 4.9
completely labelled facets have to come in pairs. If the polytope is not simplicial,
we need to prove that there is no facet containing the affinely independent points
r1, . . . ,rd−1,ed . The affine hyperplane spanned by those points is of the form {x |
v>x = λ} where v = 1+(λ −1)ed . Hence v>ei = 1 for 1≤ i≤ d−1 and v>rd =
λ +(λ −1)rdd . Since rdd > 0 by assumption, v>rd > λ if and only if λ > 1. This
implies that rd and e1 . . . ,ed−1 are on opposite sides of the hyperplane spanned by
r1, . . . ,rd−1,ed , hence the latter set of points cannot be contained in a facet.
Now consider a matrix R and some permutation pi so that EpiRE−1pi is an upper tri-
angular P-matrix. We need to prove that the polytope P generated by the columns
of R and I, where the ith columns of both matrices have label i, cannot have any
completely labelled facets except for the trivial ones. This can essentially be seen
using the above result for upper triangular P-matrices, since multiplication by Epi
from the left is just an affine transformation, while multiplication from the right by
E−1pi permutes the vertices of the polytope and can be offset by a corresponding re-
labelling. More precisely, assume F was a completely labelled facet of conv[I , R],
spanned by e j, j ∈ J, and rk,k ∈ K, where J ∪K = {1, . . . ,d}. As made precise
earlier, multiplication of a matrix by E−1pi from the right is equivalent to permut-
ing the columns of that matrix. Hence the polytope P′ generated by the columns of
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R′=RE−1pi and I′= IE−1pi still has F as a facet, which is spanned by the jth columns
of I′ for j ∈ pi−1(J), and the kth columns of R′, for k ∈ pi−1(K). The labelling of
P induces a natural labelling on P′, where the label of the ith column of R′ and I′
is pi(i). Now permute the labels of the polytope P′ by pi−1; this is equivalent to
giving the ith column of I′ and R′ label i. Then F is still a completely labelled
facet of the relabelled polytope P′. Now we can apply the linear transformation
Epi to the relabelled polytope conv[I′ , R′]. Since this does not change the combi-
natorial structure nor the labelling of the polytope we can conclude that EpiF is a
completely labelled facet of the polytope conv[I , EpiRE−1pi ]. This facet is spanned
by the unit vectors e j, j ∈ pi−1(J), each with label j, and by the kth columns of
EpiRE−1pi for k ∈ pi−1(K), each with label k. By the first part of the proof, either
pi−1(J) or pi−1(K) must then have been empty, which in turn implies that either J
or K must have been empty.
In Theorem 4.12, the condition that R is permutation-similar to a P-matrix is cru-
cial: The matrix
R =

2 1 2
0 1 1
0 0 −1

is upper triangular but not a P-matrix, and the polytope conv[I , R] has four com-
pletely labelled facets.
The following useful result is due to Johnson et al. (2003), who proved that every
matrix with positive determinant is the product of at most three P-matrices. Using
the same proof, their result can easily be modified so that it applies to P-matrices
that are permutation-similar to upper triangular matrices, which we need for our
construction.
Proposition 4.13. Every non-diagonal matrix A with positive determinant is the
product of exactly three matrices
A = RST
where R,S and T are permutation-similar to upper triangular P-matrices.
We essentially follow the proof of Johnson et al. (2003, Theorem 2.6) for non-
diagonal matrices, and point out where we keep track of the shape of the P-matrices.
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We first need the following lemma, analogous to Johnson et al. (2003, Lemma 2.4).
A d× d matrix has a nested sequence of positive principal minors if it contains a
sequence of positive principal minors of descending order d, . . . ,1, such that each
minor’s index set contains the next.
Lemma 4.14. For every non-diagonal d× d matrix A with positive determinant
there exists a matrix R such that AR has a nested sequence of positive principal
minors, and R is permutation-similar to a lower triangular P-matrix.
Proof. The proof is by induction on d. Since A is non-diagonal, we can find a
permutation matrix Epi such that A′ = EpiAE−1pi has its entry a′12 non-zero. It now
suffices to find a matrix R, permutation-similar to an upper triangular P-matrix,
such that A′R has a nested sequence of positive principal minors, as then does
E−1pi (A′R)Epi = A(E−1pi REpi).
For d = 2, choose r such that a′11+a′12r > 0. Then for
R =
(
1 0
r 1
)
A′R has a nested sequence of positive principal minors.
Now for d > 2, let
ˆR =
(
1 0
r I
)
where I is the (d−1)× (d−1) identity matrix, and r = (r1,r2,1, . . . ,1) for r1,r2 ∈
R that we will have to choose suitably. We get
ˆR−1 =
(
1 0
−r I
)
Now partition
ˆR−1A′−1 =
(
b v>
u B
)
where B is a (d− 1)× (d− 1)-matrix. Write A′−1 = (αi j)1≤i, j≤d . If α12 = 0, the
second column of A′−1 must have one non-zero off-diagonal entry: The product
of the first line of A′ with the second column of A′−1 must be zero, which implies
that if all off-diagonal entries of the second column of A′−1 were zero, the whole
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column would have to be zero since a′12 6= 0. Hence for the first column of B we
get that its entry bi1 = α ′(i+1)2 6= 0 for some i ≥ 2. If α12 6= 0, we can choose r2
such that
b21 =−r2α12+α32 6= 0
Hence in both cases B is non-diagonal. The (1,1) entry of A′ ˆR is a′11 + a′12r1 +
a′13r2 + a
′
14 + · · ·+ a′1d . Since a′12 6= 0, we can choose r1 such that this sum is
positive. Since det( ˆR−1A′−1) > 0, Cramer’s rule implies that det(B) > 0. Hence
det(B−1)> 0, and B−1 is also non-diagonal.
By induction hypothesis there is a (d−1)×(d−1)matrix S, permutation-similar to
a lower triangular P-matrix, such that B−1S has a nested sequence of positive princi-
pal minors. Hence so has S−1B, since any principal minor of a non-singular matrix
M equals the determinant of M, multiplied by the complementary principal minor
of the inverse matrix M−1 (Cottle et al., 1992). Moreover, S−1 is permutation-
similar to a lower triangular P-matrix (in particular, it has positive determinant).
We get(
1 0
0 S−1
)(
1 0
−r I
)
A′−1 =
(
1 0
0 S−1
)(
b v>
u B
)
=
(
b v>
S−1u S−1B
)
where the latter matrix has positive determinant, hence by choice of S a nested
sequence of positive principal minors. But the product of the first two matrices is
R−1 =
(
1 0
−S−1w S−1
)
which is permutation-similar to a lower triangular P-matrix since S−1 is.
Proof of Proposition 4.13. By Lemma 4.14, there exists a matrix T such that
AT−1 has a nested sequence of positive principal minors, and T−1 is permutation-
similar to a lower triangular P-matrix (hence so is T ). This means that there is a
permutation matrix Epi such that EpiAT−1E−1pi has a leading sequence of positive
principal minors. Then EpiAT−1E−1pi has a LU-factorization EpiAT−1E−1pi = LU ,
where L and U are lower and upper triangular P-matrices, respectively (Cottle et
al., 1992). We get
A = E−1pi LUEpiT = (E−1pi LEpi)(E−1pi UEpi)T
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Since every lower triangular P-matrix is permutation-similar to an upper triangular
P-matrix, the result follows for R = E−1pi LEpi and S = E−1pi UEpi .
4.7 Re-arranging the polytope P4
In the following sections, we give a proof of our main theorem in the polytope
version, Theorem 4.2. We want to use the P-matrix prisms from the previous sec-
tion, whose completely labelled facets we know. Our goal is to create a stack of
such prisms between the two completely labelled facets F and F0 of the polytope
P4 in Theorem 4.2. One of the completely labelled facets of a P-matrix prism is
always the facet conv(I), which is spanned by the unit vectors. To adapt to this,
we have to move the polytope P4 such that F0 is spanned by the unit vectors as
well. For this reason we formulate a slightly different version of Theorem 4.2 in
Proposition 4.15, where P4 is transformed accordingly. After this transformation,
the facet F has positive orientation (this will become clear later when we explain
the transformation in more detail).
The idea of the proof then is as follows: If we write F = conv(C), where the
columns of C are ordered according to their labelling, C must have positive deter-
minant. Using Proposition 4.13, we write C = RST as a product of three matrices
that are permutation similar to upper triangular P-matrices. Using these matri-
ces, we generate a stack of three polytopes between the facets F and F0, such that
each polytope in the stack has only two completely labelled facets, i.e. its top and
bottom. More precisely, we use the three polytopes conv[I , R], conv[R , RS] and
conv[RS ,C] for our stack. All that remains to do is to expand the facets conv(R)
and conv(RS) of the polytopes in the stack to “catch” all of the polytope P4 in the
interior of the extended polytope, except for the top facet F and bottom facet F0.
For a visualisation see Figure 4.2.
One of the crucial points for this idea to work is that the facets F and F0 have to
be parallel. This is only possible if the two facets are disjoint; if the share certain
points, we have to impose an analogous technical condition, stated as equation
(4.16) in Proposition 4.15.
In the remainder of this thesis, we will often have to refer to the columns of a given
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Figure 4.2: Example of using Theorem 4.12 and Proposition 4.13 to create a
stack of polytopes that by extension makes the facets F and F0 the only com-
pletely labelled facets of the extended polytope.
matrix. Unless stated otherwise, we use the corresponding lowercase letter for the
columns of a matrix, i.e. ci for a matrix C etc.
Proposition 4.15. Let P4= conv[I ,C ,C′] be a labelled simplicial polytope, where
C and C′ are positive d× k and d× n matrices respectively, for some 2 ≤ k ≤ d
and n ≥ 0. Assume that all columns of C and C′ are contained in the open half-
space {x | 1>x> 1}, and both ei (for 1≤ i≤ d) and ci (for 1≤ i≤ k) have label i (we
do not need any condition on the labels of C′). Suppose we are given a positively
oriented completely labelled facet
F = conv{c1, . . . ,ck,ek+1, . . . ,ed}
Denote by
(0
1
)
the vector with 0’s in the first k coordinates and 1’s in the others,
and by
(1
0
)
the vector 1− (01). Assume that F can be written as
F = {x ∈ P4 | (α(10)+(01))>x = 1} (4.16)
for some α < 1, where (α(10)+ (01))>x ≤ 1 for x ∈ P4. Then we can add labelled
vertices to P4 such that the only completely labelled facets of the extended polytope
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are F and F0 = conv(I). It suffices to add k(d− k+ 1) vertices if k < d, and 2d
vertices if k = d.
It is easy to see that Proposition 4.15 implies Theorem 4.2. Before we see how this
works, two useful results:
Lemma 4.16. For δ > 1/d and E the matrix having all entries equal to 1, the
affine transformation
Rd → Rd, x 7→ (δE− I)−1x
is orientation preserving if d is odd, and orientation reversing otherwise.
Proof. It suffices to calculate the determinant of δE− I. By multi-linearity of the
determinant and Laplace expansion, this determinant is easily seen to be δd(−1)d−1+
(−1)d , which is positive (negative) if d is odd (even).
Lemma 4.17. Every pure strategy equilibrium in a non-degenerate bimatrix game
can be made the unique equilibrium by adding one strategy for the column player.
The payoff column for the row player can be chosen to be a suitable unit vector.
Proof. This is straightforward; see von Schemde (2005, Lemma 4.1).
Now we prove that Proposition 4.15 implies Theorem 4.2
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Assume we are given a labelled simplicial d-polytope
P4 with 0 in its interior, and let F0 and F be two completely labelled facets of
opposite orientation. By linearly transforming the polytope P4, we can assume
without loss of generality that the completely labelled facet F0 is spanned by the
negative unit vectors, each labelled canonically, while 0 is still contained in the
polytope. By a coordinate change and a relabelling of vertices we can assume the
completely labelled facet F to be of the form F = conv{c1, . . . ,ck,−ek+1, . . . ,−ed}
for some 1≤ k≤ d, where ci has label i, and the negative unit vectors still have their
canonical labelling. Let C = [c1 · · ·ck], and denote by C′ the (potentially empty)
matrix of the remaining vertices of P4, i.e. the vertices neither in F nor F0. We
are now in the situation of a polytope given by a unit vector game as in Lemma
4.10. Hence the completely labelled facets of P4 correspond to the equilibria of
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a bimatrix game ([U U ′], [B B′]), where B,B′ are rescaled versions of C,C′, and
U,U ′ consist of unit vectors.
For the case k = 1, there is a simple game-theoretic proof for the fact that we can
make the two facets F and F0 the only completely labelled facets of the polytope by
adding just one strategy (see Lemma 4.17). Hence for the remainder of the proof,
we can assume k ≥ 2.
We can rescale the rows of [B B′], each by a positive scalar, such that the strat-
egy of the row player in the equilibrium corresponding to the facet F is uniformly
distributed. This corresponds to multiplying [B B′] from the left by a suitable di-
agonal matrix with positive diagonal entries. This procedure does not change the
combinatorial structure of P, hence neither that of P4: In the definition of P, we
can easily replace B by a multiple DB for some positive diagonal matrix D, and
obtain a linearly equivalent polytope. Also, by a suitable choice of rescalation, we
can assume that 0 is still contained in P4.
After rescaling, the facet F is given by {x ∈ P4 |
(
α
(1
0
)− (01))> x = 1} for some
α > −1, with
(
α
(1
0
)− (01))> x < 1 for all vertices x of P4 that are not in F . By
applying the affine transformation Tµ : x 7→ (I + µE)x+ µ1 = x+ µ(1>x+ 1)1,
for µ big enough, we can assume without loss of generality that C,C′ > 0. This
affine transformation leaves F0 invariant and stretches the rest of the polytope to-
wards infinity, while keeping 0 in the interior of the polytope. Since 0 remains in
the polytope, during the transformation no facet-defining hyperplane crosses the
origin, hence F and F0 keep their orientation.
Note that a linear transformation of a polytope by a non-singular matrix M changes
a normal v on a facet F to (M>)−1v, which is the normal on MF . Translating a
polytope changes the normal on a facet by a positive real scalar as long as the facet-
defining hyperplane does not cross the origin. Hence in our case, the normal on the
transformed facet Tµ(F) is again of the form α
(1
0
)− (01), for some new α >−1.
We need to put the polytope P4 “in the right position” by moving F0 to conv(I),
and F to some facet of positive orientation. To achieve this, we cannot use the “ob-
vious” linear transformation −I, since the transformed facet −IF would have neg-
ative orientation. Instead, we choose the following affine transformation: We add
( 1d +ε)1 to all vertices for some small ε > 0, and then apply the linear transforma-
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tion that maps 1( 1d +ε)−ei to ei. By abuse of notation, we denote the transformed
facets again by F and F0, respectively. We can choose ε small enough such that F
does not change orientation during the translation. This means that the facet defin-
ing hyperplane which defines F does not cross the origin, which also implies that,
by similar considerations as above, this hyperplane is transformed by the transla-
tion to {x | (α(10)− (01))>x = λ} for some λ > 0, and by the subsequent linear
transformation to {x | (α(10)−β(01))>x = λ} for some α,β , with strict inequality
for vertices not in F . We might even assume λ = 1, which implies β = 1 (since
ed ∈ F if k < d), and α < 1 since α =
(
α
(1
0
)
+
(0
1
))
e1 < 1 (using that e1 /∈ F).
Finally, after applying the linear transformation (( 1d + ε)E− I)−1 to the translated
polytope, by Lemma 4.16 both F and F0 have positive orientation. Hence we
can apply Proposition 4.15 and add labelled vertices to the transformed polytope
to make the facets F0 and F the only completely labelled facets. Reversing all
transformations does not change the combinatorial structure of the polytope. This
proves that Proposition 4.15 implies Theorem 4.2.
4.8 Disjoint completely labelled facets
All that remains to be done is proving Proposition 4.15. This proof takes up the
remainder of this chapter. As explained in the previous section, we would like
to insert a stack of P-matrix prisms between the two completely labelled facets F
and F0. For this, we need the two completely labelled facets of P4 to be parallel
(Figure 4.2 in Section 4.7 provides an intuition for the reasons behind this). This
can only be achieved if the two facets are disjoint. For this reason, we first give a
proof for the case of disjoint completely labelled facets in the present section. In
terms of symmetric equilibria, disjoint facets correspond to the case of a symmetric
equilibrium of full support. The general case is treated in Section 4.9.
We now prove the following result, which is slightly stronger than Proposition 4.15
for disjoint completely labelled facets.
Proposition 4.18. For d ≥ 2, consider a labelled d-polytope P4 = conv[I ,C ,C′]
where C ∈Rd×d and C′ ∈Rd×n (for some n≥ 0). Assume there is some λ > 1 such
that C>1 = λ1 and 1 <C′>1 < λ1. Then P4 has two parallel disjoint completely
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labelled facets F0 = conv(I) and F = conv(C). If F is positively oriented, we can
add a set of 2d pairwise distinct labelled points X = {x1, . . . ,x2d} to the polytope
P4 such that the following conditions hold:
(a) P4ext = conv[I ,C ,C′ , X ] has only two completely labelled facets, conv(I) and
conv(C) (where by abuse of notation we write X for the matrix [x1 . . . ,x2d ]).
(b) Any column of C′ is caught in the relative interior of the convex hull of the
added points, i.e. C′ ⊂ relint(conv(X)).
(c) Given ε1,ε2 > 0 small enough, we can choose the set X such that it consists
of two subsets X1 and X2, each of cardinality d, such that for all x ∈ X1,
1>x = 1+ ε1 and for all x ∈ X2, 1>x = λ − ε2, and P4ext is the union of the
three polytopes conv(I,X1), conv(X1,X2) and conv(X2,C).
(d) All points in X are extremal points of P4ext.
Note that this result is slightly stronger than what we actually need for the purposes
of this section: In order to prove Proposition 4.15, we could omit conditions (b)-(d)
and assume that C,C′ > 0. However, we will need this stronger version to extend
the proof to polytopes with non-disjoint completely labelled facets in Section 4.9.
Before we prove the proposition, we collect a few ingredients for the proof. The
following Lemma is needed for the top and bottom facets of each of the “stack”
polytopes to be parallel. 1
Lemma 4.19. If a matrix M is permutation-similar to an upper triangular P-
matrix, then so are DM and MD for any diagonal matrix D with positive entries.
Proof. The claim is obvious for M an upper triangular P-matrix. For M permutation-
similar to such a matrix, the claim follows directly using the following observation:
For any permutation matrix Epi and any diagonal matrix D we get
DEpi = EpiD′ (4.17)
for a suitable diagonal matrix D′. This is due to the fact that multiplying Epi by
D from the left results in the rows of Epi being scaled by the respective diagonal
1Whenever we use the term “stack(ed) polytope” in this chapter, we do not refer to the different
technical term as used in polytope theory (see Ziegler, 1995), but mean it in our illustrative sense,
hoping that this does not lead to confusion.
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entries of D, whereas multiplying Epi with D′ from the right means scaling the
columns of Epi . Using that Epi has only one nonzero entry in each row and column,
(4.17) follows easily.
The following three results will be used for expanding the facets conv(R) and
conv(RS).
Proposition 4.20. Consider a d×d matrix M such that M>1 = λ1 for some con-
stant λ 6= 1. For any vector s such that s>1 = 0, the shear that leaves the unit
vectors invariant and maps mi to mi + s is a bijective affine transformation, hence
leaves the combinatorial structure of the polytope conv[I , M] invariant.
Proof. Define an affine transformation T :Rd →Rd,x 7→ x+ 1d 1. Consider the line
L=R1 and its orthogonal complement, L⊥ = {x | x>1= 0}. Let f : L→ L⊥ be the
linear map given by α1 7→ s dαλ−1 . Then S : L⊥⊕L→ L⊥⊕L,(x,y) 7→ (x+ f (y),y)
is a bijective linear mao (a linear shear). Now the desired shear, which leaves the
unit vectors invariant and moves mi to mi+ s, is given by T ◦S◦T−1, and the claim
follows.
In order to state the next results we need to remind the reader of the concept of a
projective map. For an introduction to projective maps in the context of polytopes
consult Gru¨nbaum (2003) or Ziegler (1995), of which we give a very short sum-
mary here. A projective map τ on Rd , given by a d×d matrix Z, vectors a,z ∈Rd ,
and some real number ad+1, is defined as
τ : {x ∈ Rd | a>x+ad+1 6= 0}→ Rd, x 7→ Zx+ z
a>x+ad+1
(4.18)
If the matrix (
Z z
a> ad+1
)
(4.19)
is non-singular, such a projective map is called a projective transformation. If
a= 0, such a projective transformation reduces to an affine transformation. We say
that a projective transformation τ is valid for a polytope P ⊂ Rd if P is contained
in one of the two half-spaces on which τ is defined. Then, τ(P) is combinatorially
equivalent to P. This view of projective maps suffices for our purposes, but a
projective map as defined in (4.18) can also be understood as the map of projective
space PdR→ PdR arising from the linear map on Rd+1 given in (4.19). For a
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short and accessible treatment of projective space and projective maps see Gallier
(2001).
Proposition 4.21. Consider a matrix M such that M>1 = λ1 for some constant
λ > 1. For any real numbers t > 1 and u 6= 1−tλd , there is a projective transforma-
tion that is valid for the polytope conv(I,M), and maps mi to tmi+u1 while leaving
the unit vectors invariant.
Proof. Choose ε = λ−1t−1 . The projective transformation given by
x 7→ (1−λ − ε)x
1>x−λ − ε
is defined on the polytope conv[I , M] for ε > 0, i.e. t > 1. It maps each unit vector
to itself, and each vector mi to tmi.
Now define µ = utλ−1 (since t,λ > 1, the denominator does not vanish). Define an
affine map
x 7→ (I+µE)x−µ1
which is bijective if and only if µ 6=−1/d, or u 6= 1−tλd . This transformation leaves
the unit vectors invariant, and maps tmi to tmi +u1. The concatenation of the two
maps yields the desired projective transformation.
Corollary 4.22. Consider non-singular matrices M,N such that M>1= λ1, N>1=
λ ′1 for some constants λ 6= λ ′. Choose any point s in the hyperplane {x | x>1= λ}.
Then for any t > 0 and M′ = M+ t(M− [s · · ·s]), the polytope conv[M′ , N] is pro-
jectively equivalent to conv[M , N]. This means that we can replace the vertices
mi by mi + t(mi− s) without changing the combinatorial structure of the polytope
conv[M , N]. Geometrically, this corresponds to “blowing up” the facet conv(M)
from the point of reference s.
Proof. By applying the linear transformation N−1 to the polytope conv[M , N], we
can assume without loss of generality that N = I and λ 6= 1. We can even assume
λ > 1, since otherwise we can reflect the polytope in the hyperplane {x | x>1= 1},
using the reflection
T : x 7→ x− 2d (1
>x−1) ·1
and applying our result to the polytope conv[T M , I], with the reflected reference
point T s.
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For the case where N = I and λ > 1, the idea is as follows: First we apply a shear
that moves s to λd 1, then we blow up the sheared polytope using the projective
transformation in Proposition 4.21, after which we need to undo the shear. More
precisely, define s′ = λd 1− s, and consider the shear that leaves the unit vectors
invariant and maps mi to mi+ s′. Define t ′ = t+1 and u= (1− t ′)λ/d. Then t ′ > 1
and u 6= 1−t ′λd , and the projective transformation in Proposition 4.21 maps mi+s′ to
t ′(mi+s′)+u1. Undoing the first shear maps t ′(mi+s′)+u1 to t ′(mi+s′)+u1−s′.
The concatenation of these three maps leaves the unit vectors invariant, and maps
mi to
t ′(mi+ s′)+u1− s′ = t ′(mi+ λd 1− s)+(1− t
′)
λ
d 1−
λ
d 1+ s
= t ′mi− t ′s+ s
= mi+ tmi− ts
Hence we get the desired map as the concatenation of a projective transformation
with two affine isomorphisms, and the claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.18. To provide geometric intuition we have sketched the
proof in Figure 4.2. We assume the columns of C to be given in the order of their
labels. This implies that det(C) > 0 since F has positive orientation. If C is non-
diagonal, we can by Proposition 4.13 write C as the product of exactly three matri-
ces C = RST , which are each permutation-similar to an upper triangular P-matrix.
If C is diagonal, it must be of the form λ I, hence can obviously be written as such
a product as well. Without loss of generality we can assume that the columns of
the P-matrices are scaled such that they add up to a suitable positive constant. This
can be achieved by choosing suitable positive diagonal matrices D,D′ and writing
C = (RD)(D−1SD′)(D′−1T ) (4.20)
which by Lemma 4.19 does not change the fact that the factors in this product are
permutation-similar to upper triangular P-matrices.
Let R′ = RS. For any choice of λ1,λ2 with 1 < λ1 < λ2 < λ , we can assume by
(4.20) that R>1 = 1λ1 and R′>1 = 1λ2. We can choose λ1 and λ2 such that all
vertices C′ which are not contained in the completely labelled facets are contained
in the set
{y ∈ Rd | λ1 < y>1 < λ2} (4.21)
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By Theorem 4.12, each of the three “stack” polytopes conv[I , R],conv[R , R′] and
conv[R′ ,C] has only two completely labelled facets, that is its “top” and “bottom”
facet. Essentially, all we need to do now is blow up the two middle facets of the
stack, i.e. conv(R) and conv(R′), so that their convex hull (together with I and
C) contains the polytope P4, and then make sure that we get a proper “stack” of
polytopes, i.e. that the convex hull of I,R,R′ and C is indeed the union of the three
stack polytopes.
By Corollary 4.22, we can blow up the facet conv(R) from its barycenter s, i.e.
replace it by
Rt = (1+ t)R− t[s . . .s]
for some t ≥ 0, without changing the combinatorial structure of any of the stack
polytopes. We can then “translate” the blown-up facet conv(Rt) into different hy-
perplanes by adding a suitable scalar multiple of 1 to the facet. This does not
change the combinatorial structure of any of the stack polytopes (as long as we
do not put any pair of facets into the same hyperplane, which would “squash” the
corresponding stack polytope). This is due to the fact that translating one of the
facets of a stack polytope by a multiple of 1 corresponds to applying the affine map
x 7→ (I+µE)x−µν1 = x+µ(1>x−ν)1 (4.22)
for suitable choices of µ and ν . Denote the translation of Rt into the hyperplane
{x | x>1 = λ ′} by Rt,λ ′ . More precisely,
Rt,λ ′ = Rt +
λ ′−λ1
d 1
Choose t big enough such that for every λ ′ in the closed interval [1,λ ], the convex
hull of I,C and Rt,λ ′ contains P4. Such a t must exist, since the function
[1,λ ]→ R,λ ′ 7→ inf{t ∈ [0,∞) | P4 ⊂ conv[I ,C , Rt,λ ′ ]}
is continuous, hence bounded. By slightly increasing t, we can assume that not
only P4 is contained in conv[I ,C , Rt,λ ′ ] for every λ ′ ∈ [1,λ ], but that the vertices
C′ of P4 that are neither on F nor on F0 are even contained in the relative interior
of that convex hull. Moreover, we can assume t to be sufficiently large such that
F0 is contained in the relative interior of conv(Rt,1), the translation of conv(Rt)
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into the hyperplane {x | x>1 = 1}. Finally, we can assume that the analogous
statement holds for the facets R′ and F : Denote by R′t the blow-up of R′ from
the barycenter of conv(R′) by the factor t, and by R′t,λ the translation of R
′
t to the
hyperplane {x | x>1 = λ}. Then we can assume t to be sufficiently large such that
F is contained in the relative interior of conv(R′t,λ ).
Our choice of the expansion factor t implies that P4 is contained in the polytope
conv[I ,C , Rt , R′t ], and C′ in its relative interior. However, so far our construction
does not guarantee that the polytope conv[I ,C , Rt , R′t ] is the union of the three
stack polytopes conv[I , Rt ], conv[Rt , R′t ] and conv[R′t ,C], whose facet structure we
know (in terms of completely labelled facets). To achieve this, we need to move
the middle facets conv(Rt) and conv(R′t) sufficiently outwards. By our choice of
expansion parameter t we can translate the facet conv(Rt) arbitrarily close to the
facet F0, and the facet conv(R′t) arbitrarily close to the facet F , while keeping the
polytope P4 inside the corresponding convex hull (and C′ in its relative interior),
and without changing the combinatorial structure of any of the stack polytopes. By
replacing Rt by Rt,1+ε1 , and R′t by R′t,λ−ε2 for some suitably small ε1, ε2 > 0, we
ensure that when we put the three stacks polytopes together, they do not start “inter-
fering with each other”: No point in F0 can see any point in the upper stack polytope
conv[R′t,λ−ε2 ,C], nor does any vertex in F see a point in the lower stack polytope
conv[I , Rt,1+ε1 ] (where we say that two points in conv[I ,C , Rt,1+ε1 , R′t,λ−ε2 ] “see”
each other if the convex hull of those two points does not intersect the relative
interior of the polytope).
We can conclude that for any small enough choice of ε1, ε2 > 0, we get that
Q = conv[I ,C , Rt,1+ε1 , R′t,λ−ε2 ]
= conv[I , Rt,1+ε1 ]∪ conv[Rt,1+ε1 , R′t,λ−ε2 ]∪ conv[R′t,λ−ε2 ,C]
i.e. the first polytope is indeed the union of three stack polytopes, as desired. We
can conclude that the facets of Q are given by the facets of the three stack polytopes,
apart from those that have been glued together (which are the two middle facets of
the stack). Since by our choice of t, Q contains every vertex C′ in its relative
interior, this implies that for X = [Rt,1+ε1 R′t,λ−ε2 ], the extended polytope P
4
ext =
conv[I ,C ,C′ , X ] does not have any completely labelled facets apart from F and
F0, which proves statement (a) of the Proposition. Statements (b)-(d) are obvious
from our construction.
93
Chapter 4. Index and Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibria
4.9 General completely labelled facets
In this section we prove Proposition 4.15 for the case in which the two completely
labelled facets are not disjoint. This proof concludes our proof of Theorem 4.2.
The main challenge in this case is that we cannot stack P-matrix prisms between
the two facets F and F0 of P4, since they share vertices. To overcome this problem,
we project the “disjoint” part of the polytope into a lower dimensional space. The
projected polytope inherits the labelling from P4, and has two completely labelled
facets, which are the projections of F and F0. These two projected facets are dis-
joint and parallel. This means that we can apply Proposition 4.18 to add points to
this lower-dimensional polytope to make the projected facets unique.
We then need to “lift” the added vertices back into the higher dimensional space, so
that we can use them as added vertices for the original polytope P4. For technical
reasons, this process of “lifting” creates several copies of each vertex added in the
lower dimension. Hence the number of vertices added to P4 is no longer bounded
by a linear function, as in the previous section, but grows quadratically.
We use the following projective projection to create a lower-dimensional polytope
from P4:
p : {x ∈ Rd | (01)>x 6= 1}→ Rd , x 7→ Ikx
1−(01)>x (4.23)
where Ik is the d×d matrix [e1 · · ·ek 0 · · ·0]. We would like to apply this projection
to the polytope conv[I ,C ,C′] in Proposition 4.15 to get a lower-dimensional poly-
tope with disjoint completely labelled facets. The projection is not defined on the
last d−k unit vectors (which are the shared vertices of F and F0), hence we need to
restrict it to the remaining vertices of P4. Figure 4.3 illustrates how the projection
transforms a d-polytope into a lower dimensional polytope.
In the following lemma, we analyze the facet structure of the projected polytope.
Lemma 4.23. Consider a d-polytope Q = conv[I , A] for some d×n-matrix A > 0
that satisfies (01)>A < 1, meaning that the projection p in (4.23) is defined on all
columns of A. Define Qk to be the k-polytope given as the convex hull of the points
e1, . . . ,ek, p(a1), . . . , p(an). Then every facet F of Q that consists of the last d− k
unit vectors ek+1, . . . ,ed and some other vertices x1, . . . ,xs (note that Q need not be
simplicial) yields a facet Fk = conv{p(x1), . . . , p(xs)} of the polytope Qk.
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Figure 4.3: Example of a projection as in (4.23) applied to a labelled simplicial
polytope of the form conv[I ,C ,C′] as in Proposition 4.15, where d = 3 and
k = 2. The 3-polytope has several completely labelled facets, among these the
unit simplex, which is the large dashed triangle on the “back” of the polytope,
and the shaded facet. The shaded 2-polytope is the projection of this 3-polytope;
the thin dashed lines indicate the projection lines.
Proof. First, observe that Qk is indeed a k-dimensional polytope. This is due to
the fact that for any set of points x1, . . . ,xr ∈ {a1 . . . ,an,e1, . . . ,ek} any affine de-
pendence of the p(xi), ∑ri=1 γi p(xi) = 0 with ∑ri=1 γi = 0, gives rise to an affine
dependence of x1, . . . ,xr,ek+1, . . . ,ed via
0 =
r
∑
i=1
γi p(xi) =
r
∑
i=1
γi
1−
(0
1
)>
xi
xi−
d
∑
j=k+1
(
r
∑
i=1
γi
1−
(0
1
)>
xi
(xi) j
)
e j (4.24)
where
r
∑
i=1
γi
1−
(0
1
)>
xi
−
d
∑
j=k+1
(
r
∑
i=1
γi
1−
(0
1
)>
xi
(xi) j
)
=
r
∑
i=1
γi
1−
(0
1
)>
xi
(1−
d
∑
j=k+1
(xi) j) =
r
∑
i=1
γi = 0
Since Q is a d-polytope, there is at least one column ai of A that is not contained in
the affine hull of the unit vectors, hence by the above calculation p(ai) cannot be
contained in the affine hull of e1, . . . ,ek, hence Qk must be k-dimensional.
Now consider a facet F = conv{x1, . . . ,xs,ek+1, . . . ,ed} of Q, given by some hy-
perplane with normal vector v. This means that for some µ ∈R, v>x≤ µ for every
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x ∈ Q, with equality exactly for x ∈ F . By scaling this inequality we can assume
that µ = 1 (if µ is negative, the direction of the inequality is reversed, but our
argument still works). Since ei ∈ F for i > k, we get that vi = 1 for those i.
We claim that Fk is defined as a face of Qk by the hyperplane with normal vec-
tor v(k) = (v1, . . . ,vk,0, . . . ,0). We need to prove that all vertices x of Qk satisfy
v(k)>x ≤ 1, with equality if x∈ Fk, and strict inequality otherwise. This is obvious
for the unit vectors e1, . . . ,ek; for any column ai = (α1, . . . ,αd) of A, the inequality
v>ai < 1 implies
v(k)>p(a) =
∑kj=1 v jα j
1−∑dj=k+1 α j
=
∑kj=1 v jα j
1−∑dj=k+1 v jα j
≤ 1 (4.25)
Since
(0
1
)>
ai < 1 for all columns ai of A, the last inequality is strict if v>ai < 1,
and becomes an equality if v>ai = 1. So Fk is indeed a face of Qk, and since F had
at least d extremal points, the argument at the beginning of the proof implies that
Fk must have had at least k affinely independent points. Hence Fk is a proper face
of maximal dimension, i.e. a facet.
The following Lemma provides a useful projective transformation with which we
can influence the shape of the normals on a given polytope.
Lemma 4.24. Consider a d-polytope Q such that 1>x ≥ 1 for all x ∈ Q and F0 =
{x ∈ Q | 1>x = 1} is a facet of Q. Let F be another facet that can be written in
the form F = {x ∈ Q | v>x = 1} where v>x ≤ 1 for all x ∈ Q. Let 0 ≤ µ < 1, and
consider the projective transformation
τ(x) =
1
µ(1>x)+1−µ · x (4.26)
Then in the transformed polytope Q′ = τ(Q), the facet τ(F) has normal
w = µ1+(1−µ) · v (4.27)
Any point on the hyperplane {x | 1>x = 1}, which contains F0, is unchanged un-
der τ .
Proof. The inverse projection map τ−1 that maps Q′ to Q is given by
τ−1(y) =
1−µ
1−µ(1>y) · y
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For x ∈Q and hence y = τ(x) ∈Q′, we want that v>x≤ 1 is equivalent to w>y≤ 1.
The latter inequality states w>x/(µ(1>x)+ 1− µ) ≤ 1, or (w− µ1)>x ≤ 1− µ .
This follows from w− µ1 = (1− µ) · v, that is, when (4.27) holds, which also
implies that v>x = 1 if and only if w>y = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.15. We can now prove Proposition 4.15 for the case of
non-disjoint facets, i.e. for k < d. As explained earlier, we would like to project
the “disjoint” part of the polytope into a lower dimensional space, using the pro-
jection defined in (4.23). For this projection to be defined on the polytope, we need
that the normal
(1
0
)
α +
(0
1
)
on the facet F satisfies α > 0. This can be achieved
by applying the transformation τ in (4.26) for some µ close to 1. Since from now
on we are only going to consider the transformed polytope, we denote the trans-
formed polytope again by P4, the transformed vertices by I,C,C′ (where I is still
the identity matrix), and the transformed completely labelled facets by F and F0.
We will add suitable vertices to the transformed polytope to make the transformed
facets unique. All we need to take care of is that at the end of our construction,
we will be able to re-transform the extended polytope using τ−1 (this restriction is
quite significant; it will force us to add a quadratically growing number of vertices,
instead of the linearly growing number in the previous section).
Denote by p the projection defined in (4.23). After the transformation τ , the ver-
tices ci,c′i of P4 still have positive entries, and the normal on the transformed facet
F is of the form
(1
0
)
α +
(0
1
)
for some α ∈ (0,1). Hence for any column c of [C C′],
we have that
c>
(0
1
)
< c>
((1
0
)
α +
(0
1
))≤ 1
which implies that the projection p is defined for c. Consider the labelled k-
polytope Q spanned by e1, . . . ,ek and p(c1), . . . , p(ck), p(c′1), . . . , p(c′n), which lives
in the subspace of Rd spanned by the first k unit vectors. The vertices ei and
p(ci) have label i (for 1≤ i≤ k); the vertices p(c′1), . . . , p(c′n) might have labels in
{k+1, . . . ,d}, but these labels are irrelevant since those vertices will vanish when
we add new labelled vertices later. By Lemma 4.23, the polytope Q has two disjoint
completely labelled facets
G0 = conv{e1, . . . ,ek}, G = conv{p(c1), . . . , p(ck)}
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Observe that since the normal on F is of the form
(1
0
)
α +
(0
1
)
, we have
α(c>i
(1
0
)
)+ c>i
(0
1
)
= 1 (4.28)
for 1≤ i≤ k. By definition of p, we get for 1≤ i≤ k
p(ci)>1 =
c>i
(1
0
)
1− (01)>ci
(4.28)= 1/α > 1 (4.29)
hence the facets G and G0 are parallel in k-dimensional space. Also, since
det[p(c1) · · · p(ck)] = t ·det[c1 · · ·ck ek+1 · · ·ed ]
for some positive real number t, we get that the orientation of G is the same as
the orientation of F , thus positive. Hence we can apply Proposition 4.18 to the
polytope Q with completely labelled facets G and G0, and add vertices y1, . . . ,y2k ∈
Rk×{0, . . . ,0} with labels in {1, . . . ,k} to Q such that the only completely labelled
facets of Qext = conv(Q∪{y1, . . . ,y2k}) are G and G0.
Assume that we could construct from the set Y = {y1, . . . ,y2k} of added vertices a
new set of labelled points X that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) the vertices C′ of the polytope P4 are caught in the relative interior of the
convex hull of the new points X and the last d− k unit vectors, i.e.
C′ ⊂ relint(conv[X , ek+1 · · ·ed ])
where by abuse of notation we write X for the matrix whose columns are
given by the vectors in X .
(ii) for each vector x in X , we get that p(x) is in Y , and the labels of x and p(x)
agree.
(iii) for each vector x in X , 1>x < 1/µ for the µ chosen at the beginning of the
proof when we applied the projection τ from (4.26). This means that the
inverse projection τ−1 is well-defined on each of the x.
We claim that those vertices X would do the trick for our original polytope. For this,
we need to prove that P4ext = conv[I ,C ,C′ , X ] has no completely labelled facets
except for F and F0. Condition (i) above implies that for 1≤ i≤ n, c′i vanishes in the
relative interior of P4ext. By condition (ii), the labels of X are contained in {1, . . . ,k}.
In order for a facet F to be completely labelled, it must then contain the vertices
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ek+1, . . . ,ed , and some other vertices b1, . . . ,bs ∈X∪{c1, . . . ,ck}∪{e1, . . . ,ek}with
labels 1, . . . ,k. By condition (ii) above and condition (d) of Proposition 4.18, each
of these vertices is mapped by p to a vertex of Qext.
Then, Lemma 4.23 implies that Fk = conv{p(b1), . . . , p(bs)} is a completely la-
belled facet of the k-polytope Qext, i.e.Fk has to be either G0 or G. Since the only
vertex of P4ext that is projected by p onto ei is ei, and the only vertex projected onto
p(ci) is ci, this implies that bi = ei for all i, or that bi = ci for all i, respectively. In
the first case, we getF = F0, in the second,F = F . Due to condition (iii) above,
we can now re-transform P4ext using the transformation τ−1 given in (4.9). Since
this re-transformation does not change the combinatorial structure of P4ext, we are
done.
Hence all that we need to do is find points X satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) above.
The original vertices Y will satisfy (i) and (ii), but in general not (iii). This is due
to the following problem: By condition (c) of Proposition 4.18, we can choose a
small positive ε such that every yi in the “first” set {y1, . . . ,yk} of added vertices
satisfies 1>yi = 1+ ε , while every yi in the “second” set {yk+1, . . . ,y2k} satisfies
1>yi = 1/α − ε . Since µ < 1, we can assume that 1>yi < 1/µ for the first set of
vertices, but this inequality may not be true for the second set of added vertices. If
we have 1>yi < 1/µ for all added vertices we are done, by setting X = Y .
Otherwise, we revert to the following trick: Since the inverse transformation τ−1
is valid for the polytope P4, we can conclude that P4 ⊂ {x | 1>x < 1/µ}. Choose
ε > 0 such that both P4 and y1, . . . ,yk are contained in the open half-space {x |
1>x < 1µ −ε}. Denote by H the hyperplane {x | 1>x = 1µ −ε}, and by H− the cor-
responding closed halfspace containing P4. By condition (b) of Proposition 4.18,
p(c′i) is contained in the relative interior of conv(Y ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This, together
with positivity of c′i, implies that c′i is in the relative interior of the d-polytope
conv[Y ek+1 · · ·ed].
It is useful to adapt the first set of vertices {y1, . . . ,yk} slightly: For 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
we replace yi by xi = ed + ρ(yi − ed), where ρ is chosen such that xi ∈ H (i.e.
ρ = 1/µ−ε−11>yi−1 ). The parameter ρ is independent of the choice of i due to condition
(c) of Proposition 4.18. Since ρ > 1, the point yi is a convex combination of
xi and ed , and we get that C′ is in the relative interior of the convex polytope
M = conv{x1, . . .xk,yk+1, . . . ,y2k,ek+1, . . . ,ed}. By our choice of the hyperplane H
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it also follows that C′ is contained in the relative interior of the polytope M− =
M∩H−. We would like to use the vertices of the latter polytope M− to complete
our desired set of points X .
What are the vertices of M−, expressed in terms of the vertices of M? M− keeps
those vertices of M that are contained in H−, looses those vertices of M that are in
the opposite open halfspace H+\H, and gets a new vertex on H for each edge of M
from a vertex of M in H−\H to a vertex of M in H+\H. Since we replaced the ver-
tices y1, . . . ,yk by vertices x1, . . . ,xk contained in H, the only vertices of M in H−\H
are the unit vectors e1, . . . ,ed . Hence M has vertices ek+1, . . . ,ed ,x1, . . . ,xk, and ad-
ditionally gets a vertex at each intersection of an edge of M with the hyperplane H
that has yi as one endpoint and e j as the other endpoint, for some k+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k
and 1 ≤ j ≤ d. For each k+1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, denote by Xi the set of vertices of M that
arise from an edge between yi and one of the e j. What is the cardinality of Xi? By
condition (c) of Proposition 4.18, for any k+1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, there is no edge from yi
to any of the vertices e1, . . . ,ek. Hence the worst that can happen is that we get an
edge for each pair (yi,e j), where k+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, and k+ 1 ≤ j ≤ d. This means
that for each yi, the cardinality of Xi is at most d− k.
Viewing Xi as matrices, let X = [x1 · · ·xk Xk+1 · · ·X2k], where xi inherits the label of
yi, and the columns of X j inherit the label of y j. By construction, this set satisfies
condition (i) above. Condition (iii) is true since by construction, M− ⊂ H− ⊂ {x |
1>x< 1/µ}. As for condition (ii), observe that for any x ∈Rk×0⊂Rd , any ρ > 0
and j ∈ {k+1, . . . ,d}(0
1
)>
(e j +ρ(x− e j)) = 1+ρ(
(0
1
)>
x−1) = 1−ρ < 1
hence the projection p defined in (4.23) is defined on that point, and p(e j +ρ(x−
e j)) = x. The last equation, which is true only since the last d− k coordinates
of x vanish, implies condition (ii). Hence we have found the desired set X =
[x1 · · ·xk Xk+1 · · ·Xd ] of labelled vertices that need to be added to the polytope P4
to make F and F0 the only completely labelled facets. The cardinality of this set is
at most k+ k(d− k).
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4.10 Open questions
In the previous section we have seen that for a symmetric equilibrium of positive
index, with support size k< d in a d×d symmetric game, we might need to add k+
k(d− k) strategies to make the equilibrium unique. As a first improvement on this
bound we would hope to achieve a linear bound in k. However, an even stronger
bound might be suggested: It is quite obvious that any pure Nash equilibrium of
some bimatrix game can be made unique by adding a single strategy for the column
player (see Lemma 4.17). This raises the question whether it should in general
suffice to add k strategies, where k is the size of the support.
Another open question concerns our P-matrix construction. In Theorem 4.12 we
proved that for P-matrices that are permutation-similar to an upper triangular ma-
trix, the corresponding “canonical P-matrix-prism” has only two completely la-
belled facets. This statement is certainly true for any positive P-matrix as well, as
long as the corresponding prism is simplicial. Otherwise Proposition 4.9 could be
used to construct a principal minor of negative determinant. However, it is unclear
in how far Theorem 4.12 holds for general P-matrices.
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